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THE RHETORICAL ALLURE OF POST-RACIAL PROCESS DISCOURSE 
AND THE DEMOCRATIC MYTH 
 
Cedric Merlin Powell* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With devastating ease, the Roberts Court has pronounced a series of decisions 
that mark a new era in the Court’s race jurisprudence—post-racial 
constitutionalism.1 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action is the latest 
incarnation of this doctrinal posture, but there is something discernibly distinct at 
work here. The Court is now actively engaged in promoting a post-racial view of 
society that embraces white privilege and ignores structural inequality.2 “In this age 
                                                   
* © 2018 Cedric Merlin Powell. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty 
Research and Development (2015–2017), University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School 
of Law. B.A., Oberlin College; J.D., New York University School of Law. I presented a draft 
version of the first section of this article at the Sixth Annual John Mercer Langston Writing 
Workshop at California-Irvine School of Law in July 2015. My thanks to all the 
commentators, especially Professor Ralph Richard Banks, Jackson Eli Reynolds Professor 
of Law, Stanford Law School; Professor Charlton Copeland, M. Minnette Massey Chair in 
Law, University of Miami School of Law; Professor Mario Barnes Associate Dean for 
Faculty Research and Development, California-Irvine School of Law, and Professor Darren 
Lenard Hutchinson, Stephen C. O’Connell Chair, University of Florida Levin College of 
Law. Special thanks to Whitney Railey, University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School 
of Law, J.D. (2015), for her insightful research, and Bryan Mercke, University of Louisville 
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, J.D. (2018) for his thorough research and editorial 
comments. Finally, my thanks to the Utah Law Review staff for their professionalism and 
editorial expertise. Any errors are, of course, my own. 
1 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637–38 (2014) 
(plurality opinion) (affirming a voter-initiated Michigan constitutional amendment 
prohibiting the use of race, as one of many factors, in higher education admissions decisions, 
employment, or contracting); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630–31 (2013) 
(ignoring the present day effects of structural inequality and striking down the coverage 
formula, § 4(b), of the Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional because it was based on “old” 
historical data that referenced discrimination that purportedly has long since been 
eradicated); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (holding that the City of New 
Haven violated Title VII when it failed to certify the racially disproportionate results of a 
Fire Department officer promotion examination in the absence of a strong basis in evidence 
that it would be subject to disparate impact liability); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 740–47 (2007) (holding that voluntary school 
assignment plans in Louisville and Seattle, which employed race as one of many factors to 
maintain integrated schools, were unconstitutional in the absence of identifiable de jure 
segregation).  
2 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976). Structural inequality denotes 
the complexity of discrimination beyond the formalistic doctrinal boundaries set by the Court 
in doctrines such as the requirement of discriminatory intent: 
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of covert racism, the conception of racism must change to capture its clandestine 
nature. The majority of society, which the Supreme Court reflects, misperceives 
racism as merely hateful individuals engaging in overtly racist acts.”3 Advancing 
formalism and post-racialism,4 the Court is thoroughly engaged in 
constitutionalizing inequality through post-racial proceduralism.5 Through post-
                                                   
The term structural inequality is broad and is in a rough sense the inverse of the 
state action doctrine. That is, structural inequality refers to existing conditions of 
inequality that are not directly attributable to a specific past act of governmental 
discrimination that would give rise to a right to race-conscious relief under the 
Equal Protection Clause. It includes “the institutional defaults, established 
structures, and social or political norms that may appear to be . . . neutral, non-
individual focused, and otherwise rational but that taken together create and 
reinforce” segregation and inequality. 
 
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Contingent Equal Protection: Reaching for Equality After Ricci and 
Pics, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 397, 399 (2010) (quoting Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, 
The Post-Parents Involved Challenge: Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1015, 1016 n.3 (2008)); R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 
1536 n.42 (2011) (discussing and cataloguing scholarship on structural inequality). Unless it 
is “obvious” on its face, the Court has failed to acknowledge the existence of structural 
inequality. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating 
Racial Domination: A Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 
1, 49 (2015) (“The Court has never confronted the reality that its discussion of social tension 
within the context of affirmative action and other forms of remedial race-conscious state 
action responds primarily to whites’ opinions regarding these policies.”); Girardeau A. 
Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L. J. 187, 324 (1997) (“Nevertheless, the suggestion that 
the Supreme Court can operate in a countermajoritarian manner that is immune from the 
discriminatory inclinations of the overall political culture is a claim that is difficult to 
maintain. The Supreme Court itself is part of the political culture, and as such can stray only 
so far from popular political preferences.”). 
3 William Y. Chin, The Age of Covert Racism in the Era of the Roberts Court During 
the Waning of Affirmative Action, 16 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 3 (2015). 
4 Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1601–04 (2009) (ignoring the 
present day effects of past discrimination, the Court advances a literal conception of equality; 
thus, every individual is “equal”; and, since all state sanctioned racial oppression has been 
eliminated, then race is constitutionally irrelevant). 
5 The Court has created a doctrinal and analytical structure that reinforces popular 
opinion against affirmative action and race-conscious remedies. Post-racial proceduralism 
denotes the judicially created doctrines that make it virtually impossible to establish a 
discrimination claim. Emphasizing formalistic equality, strict adherence to the de jure-de 
facto distinction, and the strong basis in evidence standard for the narrow use of racial 
remedies, the Court all but determines the unsuccessful result of any claim brought by people 
of color. This aspect of the Court’s post-racial constitutionalism is termed post-racial 
determinism: 
 
Post-racial determinism describes the Court’s formalistic adherence to a set 
analytical framework built upon three conceptual premises: (1) all claims for 
transformative racial justice are presumptively invalid, so reverse discrimination 
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racial proceduralism, this Article locates a central analytical feature of the Court’s 
post-racial constitutionalism. The Court constructs a series of doctrinal rules and 
neutral rationales that make it virtually impossible to prove structural inequality 
without proof of particularized discrimination. Schuette adds another component to 
post-racial proceduralism—it endorses the power of the electorate to determine what 
antisubordination means under the Fourteenth Amendment and whether anti-
discrimination laws, in general, are necessary.6  
Schuette did not garner much public attention because it ostensibly maintained 
the status quo, it did not explicitly overrule the diversity principle set out in Grutter 
v. Bollinger,7 nor did it address the constitutionality of race-conscious remedies.8 
The Court fashioned its decision as one about the democratic process, and how it 
should function. Inevitably, the Court emphasizes process values over substantive 
constitutional rights;9 it minimizes the present day effects of past discrimination;10 
and posits neutral process rhetoric to rationalize a fundamental restructuring of the 
political process, which ultimately ensures that any significant progress on racial 
inclusion will be undermined.11 
  
                                                   
claims advanced by “injured” whites are virtually guaranteed success; (2) anti-
discrimination law has largely achieved its purpose so an “expansive” view of 
constitutional protections must be rejected and replaced by a narrow view that 
ultimately leads to the reversal of these “unnecessary” race laws; and (3) the shift 
from colorblind to post-racial constitutionalism means that race should never be 
a factor in institutional decision-making—when it is, it is appropriate for the Court 
to intervene and “correct” the process notwithstanding the fact that the political 
community has chosen to pursue a race-conscious remedial approach. 
 
Cedric Merlin Powell, Justice Thomas, Brown, and Post-Racial Determinism, 53 
WASHBURN L. J. 451, 452 (2014). 
6 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638 (“This case is not about how the debate about racial 
preferences should be resolved. It is about who may resolve it.”).  
7 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
8 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630 (“The question here concerns not the permissibility of 
race-conscious admissions policies under the Constitution but whether, and in what manner, 
voters in the states may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in 
governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.”).  
9 Id. at 1631, 1638 (emphasizing the values of democratic debate under the First 
Amendment and citizen involvement). 
10 Id. at 1637–78 (noting that there is no injury inflicted on racial minorities on these 
facts). 
11 Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment 
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L. J. 1197, 1212 (2010) (discussing the inverted “civil 
rights” language in the Court’s opinions and noting that “[i]mplicit in this language is that 
the Civil Rights era achieved racial equality, rendering racial oppression discourse obsolete. 
Also festering in this fiction of competing ethnic interests was the complete denial of white 
privilege.”); Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality: Colorblindness, Frederick 
Douglass, and Inverted Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 823, 884 (2008) 
[hereinafter Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality]. 
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All of the democratic tropes espoused by the Court—the First Amendment 
values of debate and an enlightened citizenry;12 the states as laboratories of 
democracy and experimentation;13 and access to an open and neutral political 
process14—obscure the wholesale dismantling of race-conscious remedial 
approaches to the eradication of structural exclusion. It is hard to argue with voters 
having their say in the political marketplace; however, in Schuette, the Court 
permitted the Michigan voters to determine the substantive contours of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Justice Kennedy’s Schuette plurality opinion is premised on the fact that there 
is no intentional discrimination on the part of the state; thus, there is no remediable 
injury.15 Accordingly, since race-conscious remedies in Michigan served their 
purpose, at least in the minds of the electorate, it is appropriate to advance a voter 
initiative to prohibit race-conscious remedies and have it formalized by the 
legislature in an amendment to the Michigan Constitution.16 In this vein, the voters 
are simply “constitutionalizing” the post-racial neutrality embraced by the Court in 
its opinions. Significantly, six justices, despite their distinct doctrinal interpretations 
of the political process doctrine,17 all presume that there is no particularized 
discrimination by the state; this leads to the conclusion that the political process is 
fair and open.18 This is the Rhetorical Allure of Post-Racial Process Discourse and 
the Democratic Myth. 
As the title of this Article suggests, the Court uniformly advances process-based 
values, but Schuette represents a fundamental reinterpretation of the Court’s seminal 
political process decisions19 and further reinforces the Roberts Court’s post-racial 
                                                   
12 Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1636–37. 
13 Id. at 1630, 1637–38. 
14 Id. at 1636. 
15 Id. at 1633; Cedric Merlin Powell, Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality: 
Opportunity, Results, and Neutrality, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 255, 286–87 (2012) 
[hereinafter Powell, New Conceptions of Equality].  
16 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636 (“Michigan voters used the initiative system to bypass 
public officials who were deemed not responsive to the concerns of a majority of the voters 
with respect to a policy of granting race-based preferences that raises difficult and delicate 
issues.”). 
17 Id. at 1636 (“[The] question is not how to address or prevent injury caused on account 
of race but whether voters may determine whether a policy of race-based preferences should 
be continued.”); id. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(“I would instead reaffirm that the ‘ordinary principles of our law [and] of our democratic 
heritage’ require ‘plaintiffs alleging equal protection violations’ stemming from facially 
neutral acts to ‘prove intent and causation and not merely the existence of racial disparity.’”); 
id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that there was no Equal Protection Clause 
violation because there was no restructuring of the political process to harm minorities).  
18 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633–36; id. at 1647–48 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 
1649–51 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
19 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 379–81 (1967) (holding that Section 26 of the 
California Constitution, which was approved in a statewide voter initiative, was 
unconstitutional because the power of the state would be placed behind the private right to 
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constitutionalism, proceduralism, and determinism.20 Schuette is the embodiment of 
the Court’s post-racial process discourse: it specifically references and advances 
post-racial constitutionalism; it elevates process-based proceduralism over 
substantive constitutional rights; and it ensures that any race-conscious approach 
will be presumptively unconstitutional.  
Constructing a new definition of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court actually encourages reverse discrimination suits (or voter initiatives) based 
on the “injury” of race consciousness.21 Schuette pushes this proposition even further 
by constitutionalizing mere access to the political process as a normative 
constitutional principle, and embracing a contrived democratic model that permits 
the majoritarian electorate to determine how equal protection is defined in our polity. 
Where there is no clearly identifiable discrimination, states are free to pull back from 
overly “expansive” race-conscious remedial approaches to eradicate inequality. This 
is a defining feature of the Court’s formalist conception of equality; it is also a recipe 
for retrogression. 
The doctrinal and conceptual linchpin of post-racial constitutionalism is post-
racial proceduralism, which functions as a neutral rationale for structural inequality. 
“From its colorblind jurisprudence to its post-racial jurisprudence, the Court 
consistently articulates a process view of polity so that substantive considerations of 
                                                   
discriminate: “[the provision] does not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial 
discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial 
discrimination in the housing market.”); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 (1969) 
(declaring City Charter amended by voter initiative unconstitutional because it suspended 
operation of anti-discrimination housing ordinance and placed a special burden on racial 
minorities by “requir[ing] the approval of the electors before any future ordinance could take 
effect.”); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982) (applying Hunter 
and invalidating a voter initiative which “place[d] special burdens on racial minorities” by 
reallocating decision-making power at a different level of government to impede any 
attempts by people of color to enact anti-discrimination legislation); cf. Crawford v. Bd. of 
Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 542 (1982) (decided the same day as Washington v. Seattle, concluding 
that Hunter was inapplicable and holding Proposition I, an amendment to the California state 
Constitution, constitutional as a mere repeal of race-related legislation, which went beyond 
the requirements of the federal Constitution by prohibiting de jure and de facto school 
segregation; having done so, “the State was free to return in part to the standard prevailing 
generally throughout the United States.”). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) 
(applying rational basis review to invalidate Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution 
because it placed a special disability and burden on gays and lesbians by classifying them 
“by a single trait and then den[ying] them protection across the board.”).  
20 See Powell supra note 5; Powell, New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 15, at 
267–86. 
21 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (noting that 
some states “have gotten out of the racial-preferences business altogether. And with our 
express encouragement: ‘Universities in California, Florida, and Washington State, where 
racial preferences in admissions are prohibited by state law, are currently engaging in 
experimenting with a wide variety of alternative approaches.’”).  
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race are ignored.”22 This is why post-racial process discourse is so alluring—it 
privileges the democratic myth of access23 while simultaneously offering a rationale 
for the enduring features of the present day effects of past discrimination: 
 
[B]ecause the [political] system is generally well-functioning, 
individuals can organize themselves into groups to advance their discrete 
interests. So, any systemic discrimination is aberrational and must be 
identified through a finding of intent (state action). This means that a 
substantial portion of structural inequality, racial disparities, and 
unconscious racism is left unchecked and intact.24  
 
This leads to the disconcerting conclusion that whenever the Roberts Court 
addresses a racial issue, the result is virtually predetermined25 based upon its 
formalistic interpretation of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is post-
racial determinism.26  
Advancing an analysis of the Court’s political process decisions,27 this Article 
posits that the Court erroneously decided Schuette by discarding the doctrinal 
underpinnings of these decisions and focusing instead on process rather than 
substantive equality. This is the essence of the Court’s post-racial proceduralism. 
Schuette can be understood as a decision that embraces processual values28 so that 
inequality is construed narrowly and equality of opportunity is interpreted broadly 
so that the neutral process value of access is a substitute for substantive equality.29  
 
                                                   
22 Cedric Merlin Powell, From Louisville to Liddell: Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, 
and the Post-Racial Equal Protection Clause, 40 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 153, 163 (2012) 
[hereinafter Powell, Louisville to Liddell]. The Court’s colorblind jurisprudence is premised 
on the use of race in two narrowly defined instances: (i) to eradicate identifiable 
discrimination by the state, and (ii) to promote diversity and inclusion in post-secondary 
education. The Roberts Court has shifted to post-racial constitutionalism where race should 
never be considered in decisionmaking. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. 
23 Mere access is insufficient if the process itself has been restructured to undermine 
the mandate of the anti-subordination principle underlying the Fourteenth Amendment. 
24 Powell, Louisville to Liddell, supra note 22, at 168. 
25 Of course, there are “minor” victories and steps toward progress such as when the 
Court endorses an incremental approach to equality, but even here substantive equality is a 
secondary consideration in light of the impact on white interests. See DERRICK BELL, FACES 
AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 12 (1992).  
26 See Powell supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
27 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
28 Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 935, 935–37, 976 (1994). 
29 Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 MO. L. REV. 443, 456 (2010) (“The 
definition of ‘discrimination’ must include neutral structures and processes that create a 
disparate impact on persons who have suffered discrimination historically; it should also 
include behaviors that harm protected groups as a result of unconscious discrimination.”). 
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Post-racial proceduralism treats equality as a process,30 making the history, context, 
and actual outcomes that displace and impact people of color doctrinally irrelevant. 
Identifying the salient features of post-racial discourse, this Article critiques 
neutrality as it rationalizes structural inequality. Part I unpacks and conceptualizes 
the post-racial discourse that sets the context for the Court’s doctrinal 
reinterpretation of its political process decisions. After tracing the rhetorical 
components of post-racial discourse, Part I explores the Court’s emphasis of the 
neutral process value of equal opportunity, revealing how it serves to obscure the 
present day effects of past discrimination.  
Part II offers a comprehensive analysis and critique of the Court’s political 
process decisions. Focusing specifically on how the Court shifts from an interpretive 
approach premised on structural inequality to a process-based approach. Part II 
reveals how the Court constitutionalizes the electorate’s vision of a post-racial 
Constitution. The substantive mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment—the 
eradication of subordination and caste—is redefined so that access to the political 
process is the touchstone, notwithstanding any structural barriers to actual 
participation and the ability to affect change. This is the democratic myth. 
Part II unpacks Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Schuette, revealing the 
democratic myth, and concludes by comparing Justice Breyer’s surprising 
concurrence in Schuette31 with Justice Sotomayor’s structural inequality dissent.32 
Rejecting post-racial constitutionalism, Part III constructs an argument for 
substantive equality, an analytical and doctrinal approach that foregrounds structural 
inequality and rejects post-racial neutrality. The core of the antisubordination and 
anticaste principles should not be determined by the whims of the electorate. 
 
I.  POST-RACIAL PROCESS DISCOURSE 
 
In a seminal seven-part article series,33 New York Times Opinion Editorial 
columnist Nicholas Kristof explored the structural, political, and cultural aspects of 
race in light of the tragic events in Ferguson. Kristof compellingly describes 
structural inequality and the present day effects of past discrimination in his articles, 
but he also appeals to white empathy as a means of disrupting white privilege. He 
acknowledges white privilege, but his analysis is limited because he addresses 
                                                   
30 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimization in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1342 (1988). 
31 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1648–51 (2014) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 1651–83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
33 Nicholas Kristof, When Whites Just Don’t Get It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2014, at 
SR11; Nicholas Kristof, When Whites Just Don’t Get It, Part 2, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 7, 2014, 
at SR11; Nicholas Kristof, When Whites Just Don’t Get It, Part 3, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2014, 
at SR1; Nicholas Kristof, When Whites Just Don’t Get It, Part 4, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2014,at SR7; Nicholas Kristof, When Whites Just Don’t Get It, Part 5, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2014, at SR9; Nicholas Kristof, When Whites Just Don’t Get It, Part 6, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 
2016, at P9; Nicholas Kristof, When Whites Just Don’t Get It, Part 7, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2016, at SR11. 
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reverse discrimination and liberal individualism as normative concepts in the new 
discourse of post-racialism.34 The Court has actively constitutionalized the 
perceptions of white Americans in its post-racial jurisprudence by embracing these 
formalistically literal conceptions of equality. 
This is the state of affairs of post-racial discourse—neutral conceptions of the 
process, and its underlying stringent rules of proof of discrimination, are used to 
rationalize the intractable disparities that exclude and oppress communities of color. 
 
A.  The Neutral Rhetoric of Post-Racialism 
 
In post-racial discourse, several rhetorical features are readily apparent: (i) 
neutral rationales are employed to rationalize inequality as inevitable if it is 
disconnected from state action;35 (ii) there is a virtually exclusive focus on the most 
extreme instances of racism;36 (iii) discrimination is conceptualized as the product 
of individual actions, not institutional structures;37 (iv) any challenge to structural 
inequality is inverted so that it is misinterpreted as racial politics (or balkanization) 
rather than a reasonable attempt to advance substantive equality;38 and (v) post-
racialism exaggerates racial progress so that the relative, incremental advancements 
made by oppressed people of color are used to dilute the potency of arguments for 
transformative social change and undermine laws enacted to ensure that substantive 
equality exists in every segment of society.39 These rhetorical features are exchanged 
                                                   
34 See, e.g., Chin, supra note 3, at 3 (“In this age of covert racism, the conception of 
racism must change to capture its clandestine nature. The majority of society, which the 
Supreme Court reflects, misperceives racism as merely hateful individuals engaging in 
overtly racist acts.”). 
35 See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 731–32 (stating that “[s]ocietal 
discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified 
remedy . . . . a governmental agency’s interest in remedying ‘societal’ discrimination, that 
is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling 
to pass constitutional muster.”). 
36 See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Seeing Subtle Racism, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 183, 198–204, 
216 (2010) (noting decline in explicit and blatant “old fashioned” racism, and discussing 
modern racism as subtle or implicit). 
37 Wendy Tolson Ross, The Negro National Anthem Controversy, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN 
L. REV. 561, 570 (2010) (“Despite the fact that personal racial prejudices have social origins, 
racism is considered an individual and personal trait. Society’s racism is then viewed as 
merely the collection, or extension, of personal prejudices. . . . These extremely 
individualized views of racism exclude an understanding that race has institutional or 
structural dimensions beyond the formal racial classification.”) (citation omitted).  
38 Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (2013) (“On 
this increasingly dominant account, government classification by race poses risks to social 
cohesion, threatening balkanization and racial conflict, and so strict judicial oversight is 
crucial to constrain the practice”). 
39 Sahar F. Aziz, The Blinding Color of Race: Elections and Democracy in the Post-
Shelby County Era, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 182, 195–96 (2015) (“Examples 
of individual success are over-emphasized while collective disparities along racial lines are 
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between the public and the Court, forming the narrative basis for post-racialism and 
the denial that race has a continuing significance in the perpetuation of inequality in 
violation of the antisubordination mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The discussion of race in America has become ritualistic—there are rhetorical 
steps that are repeated again and again to no avail: there is a crisis or racially charged 
event; next, there is a public chorus of disbelief that such an occurrence could have 
happened in our ostensibly post-racial society;40 then, there is a charged debate about 
whether the event is racist or there is some neutral non-racial explanation for it; if it 
cannot be explained away under the guise of post-racial neutrality, then there is a 
call for a “conversation on race” and substantive solutions to address the vestiges of 
centuries of subordination; finally, the circularity of the discussion intensifies and 
then fades away until the next racial crisis. This explains the intractability of racism 
in our society.41 
Yet there is something glaringly absent from these calls for a “conversation” 
on race;42 there is no substantive conception of equality, nor is there a call to 
effectively dismantle structural inequality. The rhetorical neutrality inherent in the 
Court’s race jurisprudence reinforces this discourse.43 Just as the public discourse 
rationalizes extant structural inequality, the Court advances post-racial 
constitutionalism as a means of explaining inequality in society and preserving white 
                                                   
ignored to justify the elimination of civil rights legislation, affirmative action programs, and 
diversity initiatives.”).  
40 Unfortunately, there have been so many tragic and brutal instances of young Black 
men being the victims of the use of lethal force, by police officers, that it has become a fact 
of life in our post-racial society. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, The Far-Reaching Shadow 
Cast by Ferguson, 46 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 1, 1–7 (2014) (listing several examples of 
young Black men that have been killed by police officers). 
41 DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 192–94 (1992) (examining 
in his hauntingly prescient allegorical narrative, The Space Traders, Derrick Bell explains 
the appeal of democratic process rationales that are ostensibly neutral, but preserve white 
privilege and reinforce the permanence of racism: at the end of Bell’s allegory, the white 
citizenry votes 70 percent to 30 percent to transport African-Americans into outer space in 
exchange for desperately needed societal treasure). 
42 Charles M. Blow, Constructing a Conversation on Race, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Aug. 
20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/opinion/charles-blow-constructing-a-
conversation-on-race.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/YZL7-T988] (“I wish these calls [for 
a conversation on race] were not so episodic and tied to tragedies. I also wish this call for a 
conversation wasn’t tied to protests. Protests have life cycles. They explode into existence, 
but they all eventually die. They build like pressure in the volcano until they erupt. Then 
there is quiet until the next eruption. The cycle is untenable and nearly devoid of aim and the 
possibility of resolution.”). 
43 Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality, supra note 11, at 831 (“Rhetorical Neutrality is the 
linchpin of the Court’s colorblind jurisprudence. Three underlying myths—historical, 
definitional, and rhetorical—all serve to shift the interpretive (doctrinal) framework on 
questions of race from an analysis of systemic racism to a literal conception of equality where 
the anti-differentiation principle is the guiding touchstone.).  
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privilege.44 The rhetorical allure of post-racial discourse and the Court’s own post-
racial jurisprudence reify inequality. Since race is irrelevant and formal state 
sanctioned subjugation no longer exists, then discrimination and oppression should 
not be racialized. It is not surprising, then, that whites have moved on from race.45  
What is particularly striking about this new rhetorical posture and narrative 
conception is that whites construct all the terms of the discussion, the relevancy of 
issues, and the manner in which the discussion will be conducted predominantly.46 
This is the essence of white privilege47 and post-racialism. The tenor of post-racial 
discourse in America is illustrated by these reader responses to Kristof’s articles on 
race, each denotes a thematic thread that runs through public discussions of race and 
the Court’s post-racial jurisprudence: 
 
1. “Only when there is honest cross-racial dialogue will this country be 
able to finally move beyond the stereotypes and racial prejudice that have 
unfortunately been woven in our fabric and history for the past 300 
years.”48 
 
2. “Let us not forget our history, good and bad. Let us not ignore the past, 
if we don’t want to relive it. But please do not saddle me or my children 
and grandchildren with eternal guilt. I get it, Part 1, 2, 3 and 4.”49 
                                                   
44 Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 49 (“The Court has never confronted the reality that its 
discussion of social tension within the context of affirmative action and other forms of 
remedial race-conscious state action responds primarily to whites’ opinions regarding these 
policies.”). 
45 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 922–24 
(2009) (discussing how racial discourse is premised on neutralizing or completely obscuring 
the salience of race and racism in American society because whites are simply exhausted by 
the focus on race in a post-racial society).  
46 Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching 
Whiteness: Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635, 648 (2008) 
(“Discussions about race today occur in an era when the societal notion of colorblindness is 
a dominant value. The idealized notion of colorblindness tells us that noticing race is wrong 
because people are equal. The hegemony of colorblindness suggests that by noticing race, 
one is undermining equality itself.”); Barbara J. Flagg, “And Grace Will Lead Me Home”: 
The Case for Judicial Race Activism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 103, 108 (2013) 
(“Whiteness [is the ability] to define the conceptual terrain on which race is constructed, 
deployed, and interrogated. Whiteness sets the terms on which racial identity is constructed. 
Whiteness generates a distinct cultural narrative, controls the racial distribution of 
opportunities and resources, and frames the way in which that distribution is interpreted.”) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
47 See generally Paula S. ROTHENBERG, WHITE PRIVILEGE (4th ed. 2012) (providing an 
examination and explanation of white privilege).  
48 Erica Itzkowitz & Steven Itzkowitz, The Race Conversation, N.Y. TIMES: LETTERS 
(Nov. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/opinion/sunday/the-race-
conversation.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/9KUG-73YV]. 
49 Richard Allan, The Race Conversation, N.Y. TIMES: LETTERS (Nov. 16, 2014), 
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3. “It may be true, as Nicholas Kristof points out, that many whites, even 
those who intellectually oppose racial inequality, are still guilty of, at the 
least, not noticing injustice. However, it may also be true that those who 
are striving for racial equality are in some ways promoting inequality.”50 
 
4. “I am a white, middle-class college senior, and I have recently applied 
to medical school. I can easily understand why supporters of racial 
equality would want to encourage young blacks to pursue a profession as 
a doctor. And sure enough, black applicants have up to a five times better 
chance of admission as white applicants with equal qualifications, 
according to statistics from the Association of American Medical 
Colleges.”51 
 
5. “I ask myself whether it makes sense that, in promoting racial equality, 
we should consider race as a factor in any decision. I must answer 
negatively. Equality is impossible until the question of race is no longer 
posed in any forum, including those attempting to promote equality.”52 
 
All the preceding reader statements delineate the discursive boundaries inherent 
in post-racial discourse; they reflect not only the public’s views on race, but also the 
rationales upon which the Court constitutionalizes these views as legitimate 
explanations for structural inequality. The first statement is rooted in the Court’s 
articulation of the diversity principle in Grutter.53 Here, diversity is a First 
Amendment concept designed to foster “cross-racial” understanding in future 
leaders of American society.54 This rationale has been critiqued as nonsubstantive 
because it is premised on the process values of the First Amendment—access to the 
marketplace of ideas—and not on the substantive mandate of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to eradicate racial subjugation.55 
  
                                                   
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/opinion/sunday/the-race-conversation.html?mcubz 
=0 [https://perma.cc/9KUG-73YV].  
50 Jared Baird, The Race Conversation, N.Y. TIMES: LETTERS, (Nov. 16, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/opinion/sunday/the-race-conversation.html?mcubz 
=0 [https://perma.cc/9KUG-73YV]. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
54 Id. at 330. 
55 Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality, supra note 11, at 873–74.  
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The second statement, while acknowledging the historical significance of 
structural racism and its present day effects, nevertheless neutralizes it by 
emphasizing liberal individualism (“do not saddle me . . . with eternal guilt [for sins 
of the past]”)56 and rejecting the notion that structural inequality still exists (“I get 
it, Part 1, 2, 3 and 4.”).57 
Finally, the third statement reads like a victim impact statement for the Roberts 
Court’s post-racial constitutionalism. In many ways, the Court has constitutionalized 
and codified the reverse discrimination lawsuit.58 The reverse discrimination claim 
is the doctrinal fulcrum of the Roberts Court’s post-racial constitutionalism: from 
school integration,59 to voting rights,60 to employment,61 and now to the structure 
and substance of the decisionmaking process itself,62 the Court has actively 
                                                   
56 Allan, supra note 49; see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: 
Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 98 (1986) (discussing the 
“quandary of harm to innocents that a sin-based rationale [for affirmative action] inevitably 
creates”). 
57 Allan, supra note 49. 
58 Hutchinson, supra note 2, at 47–55. 
59 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schl. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48 
(2007) (rejecting diversity as a compelling interest in maintaining integrated public schools 
and concluding that there is an individual interest in admission to public school on a race 
neutral basis). See infra Part II.B.2.  
60 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (noting dramatic change in the 50 
years since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and holding that § 4(b) of the 
VRA is unconstitutional because the “old data” of discrimination, upon which it is based, no 
longer accurately reflects the current need for preclearance for covered jurisdictions); Jon 
Greenbaum et al., Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes Irrational, 57 HOW. 
L. J. 811, 825–40 (2014); see infra Section II.B.4.  
61 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009) (noting that past claims of 
discrimination, with present day effects, in hiring and promotion in the fire department of 
New Haven, were too amorphous (and did not provide a strong basis in evidence) to justify 
upsetting the expectations of white firefighters who passed an exam that disproportionately 
impacted African-American candidates who failed in substantial numbers so that there was 
virtually no representation of African-Americans in the senior officer ranks); Cheryl I. Harris 
& Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 81–82 (2010); see infra Part II.B.3. 
62 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) 
(upholding a voter initiative which amended Michigan’s Constitution to prohibit any 
consideration of race in state university admissions decisions); see also Laura McNeal, 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action: The Majority’s Tyranny Toward Unequal 
Educational Opportunity, 59 ST. LOUIS L. J. 385, 387 (2015) (“The Schuette decision has 
alarming implications for equal education opportunity because it constitutionalized statewide 
reverse discrimination suits and thus will have the effect of overturning what is left of race-
conscious measures designed to create diverse and equitable learning environments.”). It is 
particularly ironic that Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) was heralded as a 
“victory” for progressive advocates and supporters of the use of race, as one of many factors, 
in admissions decisions. The Fisher opinion by Justice Kennedy, who also authored the 
Court’s opinion in Schuette, held that the University of Texas’ use of race in a holistic review 
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embraced a contrived neutrality and formalism that reifies structural inequality and 
the oppression of people of color. The Court privileges the rights of whites over 
those of oppressed minorities; this is the very essence of white privilege.63 To the 
Roberts Court and the white public generally, anti-discrimination laws are 
unnecessary since race is no longer relevant in public life.64 Schuette reaffirms this 
post-racial principle by upholding the right of the majoritarian white citizenry to 
vote to discard race-conscious remedial approaches if they are deemed unnecessary.  
This Article attempts to deconstruct the post-racial discourse that permeates 
discussions about race and offers a critique of the Court’s race decisions that 
integrate this discourse. A core principle of post-racial discourse is that the process 
is open, and intrusive judicial review should be exercised sparingly; however, it is 
appropriate for Courts to intervene in the event of a rare process malfunction.65 
Essentially, the Court protects equal opportunity and access, not equal results based 
on race. This proposition is the foundation of post-racial process discourse. It is this 
discourse that ignores the present day effects of past discrimination, reinforces 
structural inequality, and leaves white privilege intact.  
  
                                                   
process with race as a “factor of a factor of a factor” passed strict scrutiny and was 
constitutional. Id. at 2207. Fisher does not “reaffirm” Grutter in Michigan because it was 
handed down in the wake of last term’s decision in Schuette. It held that voter initiatives 
could be used to amend the Michigan State Constitution to prohibit the use of race, in any 
form, in state policymaking. While the Court noted that the consideration of race is 
permissible in limited circumstances, under Fisher, it nevertheless embraced the voters’ right 
to prohibit consideration of race in post-secondary school admissions in Michigan. Schuette, 
134 S.Ct. at 1630. This, at least implicitly, “overrules” Grutter’s application to post-
secondary admissions in Michigan, but other states can follow Schuette as precedent unless 
there are other direct democracy challenges to the substantive mandate of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to dismantle subordination and segregation. This has already happened in eight 
states (California (1996), Washington (1998), Florida (1999), Michigan (2006), Nebraska 
(2008), Arizona (2010), New Hampshire (2011), and Oklahoma (2012)). Jess Bravin, Court 
Backs Affirmative Action Ban; Justices Uphold State Initiative to End Race-Based 
Admissions, but Are Divided on Broader Issue, WALL ST. J., April 22, 2014, at A1; see Mark 
S. Brodin, The Slow Demise of Race Preference, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 
377–78 (noting that Michigan has seen a twenty-five percent decline in minority enrollment 
and California is even worse).  
63 Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 935, 976 (1994).  
64 Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum 
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201–04 (2000). 
65 This is the Process Theory, posited by John Hart Ely, which is a theory of judicial 
review rooted in U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See Powell, 
Louisville to Liddell, supra note 22, at 154 n.4; see infra Part II.A. 
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B.  Equal Opportunity, Equal Results, and Process 
 
The allure of the democratic process is referenced throughout the Court’s race 
jurisprudence: Grutter v. Bollinger,66 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1,67 Ricci v. DeStefano,68 and Shelby Cty. v. Holder.69 All advance 
processual conceptions of equality70 while explicitly rejecting structural inequality 
as a guiding principle in constitutional analysis. These decisions serve as the 
doctrinal foundation for Schuette and its post-racial proceduralism. Under this view, 
equal opportunity is essential to the legitimacy of the process, while race-conscious 
remedies or results should be avoided at all costs. The Constitution protects 
individuals, not racial groups;71 and, it protects equal opportunity, not equal results, 
based on race.72 
These ostensibly neutral propositions protect process over substance by 
conceptualizing “equality as a process”73 and ignoring the continuing salience of 
structural inequality;74 diminishing the significance of anti-discrimination law 
because formal inequality has been eliminated from society;75 conceptualizing 
discrimination as a rare occurrence which does not exist, in the absence of 
discriminatory intent;76 narrowly confining the use of judicial review to minor  
 
 
 
                                                   
66 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
67 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
68 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
69 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
70 Flagg, supra note 63, at 964.  
71 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
72 David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction Between Equality of Opportunity and 
Equality of Result, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 171, 181–82 (1992); Jeffrey J. Wallace, 
Ideology vs. Reality: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in a Color Blind Society, 36 AKRON L. 
REV. 693, 704–13 (2003). 
73 Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 1336, 1342–43.  
74 Kiyana Davis Kiel, Brown, Fisher, and the Necessity of Context to Achieve Racial 
Equity in Public Institutions, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913, 914 (2015) (“When interpreting 
the Constitution, the lasting and pervasive impact of structural and institutional racism and 
the undercurrents of white privilege should not be ignored.”).  
75 Cho, supra note 4, at 1645 (“While race-neutral policies and rationales designed to 
camouflage the operation of racial subordination are at least as old as the post-bellum 
Amendments, what is new and distinct about post-racialism (as compared to say, 
colorblindness) is that the state’s retreat from race-based remedies is only possible in a 
society that is perceived as having made significant strides in racial equality, at least 
symbolically.”). 
76 Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 205 (2004) 
(critiquing the “individual intent” view of racism as flawed because it obscures the existence 
of structural inequality and the “central role of institutions in transmitting th[e] cumulative 
disadvantage.”).  
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process malfunctions of access rather than redressable claims of historically 
oppressed groups;77 and preserving white privilege.78  
Grutter, Parents Involved, Ricci, and Shelby County are all process-based 
decisions, which fit squarely within the Court’s post-racial constitutionalism: 
 
The Court’s post-racial jurisprudence preserves structural inequality 
under the guise of neutrality. Similarly situated individuals should not be 
differentiated on the basis of race, and equal opportunity (or equal 
treatment) is the touchstone of the Court’s post-racial jurisprudence. 
Process is valued over the eradication of caste and substantive rights. This 
process-based, market approach to substantive equality should be 
rejected—the marketplace model of equal protection where the process is 
open and individuals “compete” for goods and substantive rights is 
antithetical to the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. It ignores the 
core purpose of the amendment—the eradication of race-based 
oppression.79 
 
This is a defining feature of post-racial constitutionalism—the denial of race 
and racism so that formalistic equality determines the scope of equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The process is open to all so equality means equal 
access and treatment,80 notwithstanding the present-day effects of past 
discrimination.81 
In Grutter, this means that while diversity is a compelling interest,82 race cannot 
be the sole factor that determines any outcome in the admission process83 so that the 
process will be neutral and whites will receive the educational benefit of “cross-
                                                   
77 Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 1342 (“Nor does the restrictive view [of anti-
discrimination law] contemplate the courts playing a role in redressing harms from 
America’s racist past, as opposed to merely policing society to eliminate a narrow set of 
proscribed discriminatory practices.”). 
78 Id. (“Moreover, even when injustice is found, efforts to redress it must be balanced 
against, and limited by, competing interests of white workers—even when those interests 
were actually created by the subordination of Blacks. The innocence of whites weighs more 
heavily than do the past wrongs committed upon Blacks and the benefits that whites derived 
from those wrongs.”). 
79 Powell, New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 15, at 270. 
80 Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s conception of equal protection is rooted 
in the formalism of equal treatment; thus, the anti-subordination principle is essentially 
ignored). 
81 Khiara M. Bridges, Race Matters: Why Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas (and the 
Rest of the Bench) Believe that Affirmative Action is Constitutional, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 607, 656 (2015) (emphasizing the present-day effects of past discrimination, and 
concluding that history must be acknowledged to construct a jurisprudence that addresses 
how non-white people are still oppressed in society). 
82 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
83 Id. at 334. 
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racial” understanding.84 Of course, students of color will receive a “benefit,” too, but 
it is premised on access, not substantive equality. Jettisoning the substantive core of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s anticaste and antisubordination principles, Parents 
Involved reconceptualized Brown as a process decision, which protects an individual 
right to attend a school of one’s choice, without race being a determinative factor in 
the school assignment.85 
Ricci engrafted the formalistic intent requirement, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, on to Title VII, so that there must be “a strong basis in evidence to 
believe [an employer] will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take 
the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”86 Invalidating section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act (“VRA”), the Court in Shelby County concluded that “old data” of 
discrimination could not be the basis of remedial efforts to address the present day 
effects of past discrimination in voting.87 
These process decisions mark a clear doctrinal shift to post-racial constitutional 
proceduralism. The process defines what rights are recognized, protected, and 
privileged. This means that process and equal opportunity are touchstone principles 
when the Court examines claims of discrimination. Grutter, Parents Involved, Ricci, 
and Shelby County share a common doctrinal thread—each decision envisions an 
open process and seeks to limit any conceivable burden on the interests of whites. 
Doctrinally, these decisions favor the majoritarian interests of whites over the 
interests of historically oppressed minorities. Thus, these decisions “explain” how 
subordination remains invisible to the Court because of the rhetorical allure of post-
racial discourse. This narrative leads directly to the Court’s decision in Schuette. 
 
1.  Grutter: First Amendment Process Values 
 
Essentially, Grutter is a decision that promotes “cross-racial understanding” to 
benefit white majoritarian interests.88 Adopting a forward-looking approach,89 with 
no reference to structural inequality or the present day effects of past discrimination, 
the Court held that diversity was a compelling interest that could be pursued by the 
                                                   
84 See Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity 
Rationale on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 450 (2014); Eboni S. Nelson, 
Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 582 n.22 (2009). 
85 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743 (2007) 
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (“Brown II”)) (“At stake is the 
personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools . . . on a nondiscriminatory 
basis.”). 
86 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009). 
87 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628–29 (2013). 
88 Bryan K. Fair, Re(caste)ing Equality Theory: Will Grutter Survive Itself by 2028?, 7 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 721, 761 (2003) (“Grutter maintains the status quo primarily benefiting 
whites, and rests on an empty idea of equality. It accomplishes no substantive improvement 
in the elimination of educational caste.”). 
89 Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality, supra note 11, at 873–74. 
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University of Michigan Law School in a holistic admissions review process.90 There 
must be a critical mass of viewpoints in the classroom—the First Amendment 
marketplace of ideas must be open to all.91 But this reads the antisubordination and 
anticaste principles out of the Fourteenth Amendment, and conceptualizes access as 
the guiding principle:92 “In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the 
eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to 
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.”93 
Liberal individualism is at the thematic core of Grutter because the Constitution 
“protect[s] persons, not groups,”94 and individuals must be evaluated in a neutral 
admissions process that does not insulate them from comparison with other 
applicants due to race.95 Grutter “incorporates liberal individualism into a neutral 
group rights theory.”96 Strict scrutiny is applied to any use of race by the state, but 
there are rare instances when the use of race is permissible, such as the pursuit of 
diversity with race as a “plus” of many factors.97  
What is particularly striking about the Court’s endorsement of process and 
formalistic equality is its explicit concern about the “burden” on white interests. 
Near the end of the decision, the Court concludes, “in the context of its 
individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the 
Law School’s race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm 
nonminority applicants.”98 This proposition is integral to the Court’s process 
decisions,99 and it is graphically illustrated in the Court’s reinterpretation of Brown 
in Parents Involved.  
  
                                                   
90 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336–43 (2003). 
91 Id. at 333. 
92 Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality, supra note 11, at 878. 
93 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. 
94 Id. at 326. 
95 Id. at 334. 
96 Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality, supra note 11, at 881. 
97 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; accord Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 
(2016) (“Fisher II”) (citation omitted) (affirming Grutter, and stating that “although 
admissions officers can consider race as a positive feature of a minority student’s application, 
there is no dispute that race is but a ‘factor of a factor of a factor’ in the holistic-review 
calculus.”). 
98 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added). 
99 Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of Innocence in Standing Doctrine, 68 VAND. L. REV. 297, 
320 (2015) (“This is the essence of the innocence paradigm; it rests on the premise that whites 
are ‘innocent’ of continuing racial inequality and that they are, thereby, ‘injured’ by state 
considerations of race that seek to redress it. As a result, the use of race to identify persons 
for the purpose of distributing government benefits is itself regarded as harmful, even if white 
plaintiffs have not been specifically denied a government benefit as a result of the contested 
policy itself.”). 
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2.  Parents Involved: Individual Choice and Process 
 
Holding the Louisville and Seattle school assignment plans unconstitutional, 
the Court concluded, “without a history of state-enforced racial separation, a school 
district has no affirmative legal obligation to take race-based remedial measures to 
eliminate segregation and its vestiges.”100 This is a remarkable proposition because 
it essentially guarantees that resegregation will be irremediable—once formalized 
state dual school systems have been eradicated, the constitutional duty to integrate 
ends. The Court has subscribed to this narrow rationale since 1974.101 Eschewing 
the anticaste principle underlying the Fourteenth Amendment, the Parents Involved 
decision creates an individual right to attend an elementary or secondary school of 
one’s choice in a neutral school assignment process devoid of race. 
Brown is reinterpreted as a process decision, which had little to do with racial 
caste and stigmatization, subordination, or oppression; and, instead was based on the 
fact that school children were assigned to dual school systems based on race.102 It 
was this race-based process that was unconstitutional because individual children 
were deprived of equal educational opportunity: “It was not the inequality of the 
facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the 
Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954.”103 This puts a completely 
different analytical gloss on the Equal Protection Clause: since formal state 
mandated segregation “ended” in 1954, there is only “the personal interest [of school 
students] in admission to public schools . . . on a nondiscriminatory basis.”104 
  
                                                   
100 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 753 (2007). 
101 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–03 (1995) (holding that interdistrict 
remedy of increased spending to bring whites into the school district was invalid in the 
absence of an interdistrict violation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490–91 (1992) (holding 
that federal courts should return supervisory control to local authorities as soon as possible; 
indeed, federal control may be withdrawn completely or partially based on good-faith 
compliance with the desegregation decree); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S, 237, 249–50 
(1991) (explaining that based on a good-faith finding of compliance, a district court may 
dissolve a desegregation order where the vestiges of de jure segregation had been eradicated 
“to the extent practicable”); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436–37 
(1976) (stressing a temporal limit on federal court intervention, the Court concluded that 
once a court implemented a racially neutral attendance plan, in the absence of intentional 
racially discriminatory actions by the school board, the court could not adjust its 
desegregation order to address population shifts in the school district); Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 U.S. 717, 745, 752 (1974) (holding that interdistrict remedies must be specifically 
tailored to address interdistrict violations). These decisions illustrate that the Court has little 
concern for the vestiges of segregation if they cannot be directly traced to clearly identifiable 
discriminatory action by the state itself. See Wendy Parker, Limiting the Equal Protection 
Clause Roberts Style, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 533–34 (2009).  
102 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746. 
103 Id. (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 747 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)) 
(emphasis added). 
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What this means is that the present day effects of past discrimination, like 
resegregated public schools,105 are irrelevant to the Court in the absence of 
identifiable state discrimination. School integration is displaced by the interest of 
white students to attend their school of choice; individual school choice is 
particularly appealing as a product of a neutral school assignment process, but this 
simply replicates racially isolated schools.106 
The neutral rhetoric of post-racial process rationalizes segregated schools as the 
status quo because “[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.”107 In an 
amazing doctrinal twist, the eradication of dual school systems is supplanted as a 
constitutional imperative under the Fourteenth Amendment. Racial integration of 
schools does not require some fixed racial proportionality108—this would be a race-
based result, which is antithetical to a neutral process. But what this really means is 
that the Court will tolerate segregated school systems in the name of local control 
where there is no clearly discernible discrimination by the state itself.109 White 
students’ individual right to attend schools of their choice must take precedence over 
the claims of students of color who languish in hyper segregated schools.110 
Referring to Parents Involved as the “Resegregation case,” Professor Girardeau 
Spann unpacks the rationale of post-racial discourse: 
  
                                                   
105 Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 444–53 
(2009); Cedric Merlin Powell, Milliken, “Neutral Principles,” and Post-Racial 
Determinism, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. ONLINE 1 (2015) [hereinafter Powell, 
Milliken]. 
106 Again, this is insignificant to the Court because it is the result of voluntary choice, 
not state-mandated discriminatory action. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 750 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“Although presently observed racial imbalance might result from past de 
jure segregation, racial imbalance can also result from any number of innocent private 
decisions, including voluntary housing choices.”). The choice rationale has been critiqued 
by a number of scholars. See john a. powell, The Tensions Between Integration and School 
Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 691–92 (2001); Martha Minow, Confronting the 
Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L. J. 814, 843–48 
(2011). 
107 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 729–30 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 
(1992)). 
108 Id. at 732. 
109 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
110 Gary Orfield et al., Brown at 62: School Segregation By Race, Poverty and State, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 4–6 (May 16, 2016), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/ 
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-62-school-segregation-by-race-
poverty-and-state/Brown-at-62-final-corrected-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9AS-M6HG]. 
542 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
In the Resegregation case, the Supreme Court chose to give a seat in 
an oversubscribed school to a white student rather than a minority student, 
knowing that the likely result would be to promote segregation over 
integration. The Resegregation case therefore “overruled” Brown’s 
prohibition on racial oppression, by sacrificing the integration interest of 
minority school children in order to advance what turns out to be simply 
the segregationist interest of white parents.111 
 
This formalism is essential to the Court’s post-racial process discourse. What 
troubles the Court in Parents Involved is not the possibility of retrogression and 
resegregation, but the individualized right of white students to attend a school of 
their choice. Because there is no de jure segregation to remedy in the school systems 
of Louisville and Seattle, any attempt at maintaining diverse, integrated schools is 
rank racial balancing in direct contravention of post-racial constitutionalism.112 The 
Fourteenth Amendment is turned on its head.113  
Inequality is rationalized through a series of ostensibly neutral doctrinal 
propositions. “Racism, combined with equal opportunity mythology, provides a 
rationalization for racial oppression, making it difficult for whites to see the Black 
situation as illegitimate or unnecessary.”114 Since the process is neutral, there is no 
discrimination to remedy. So, it is inevitable that seminal anticaste and 
antisubordination decisions, like Brown, will be “overruled,”115 modified, and 
substantially revised in the name of post-racial constitutionalism. The Court has 
adopted a similar posture in reconceptualizing anti-discrimination statutes like Title 
VII. Indeed, in the Court’s post-racial jurisprudence, the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Title VII overlap doctrinally.116 
  
                                                   
111 Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 566, 600 (2008). 
112 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747–48 (“For schools that never segregated on the 
basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as 
Jefferson County [Louisville], the way ‘to achieve a system of determining admission to the 
public schools on a nonracial basis’ is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way 
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).  
113 Powell, supra note 5, at 457–77. 
114 Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 1380–81. 
115 Spann, supra note 111, at 600. 
116 Powell, New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 15, at 323. 
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3.  Ricci v. DeStefano:117 The White Burden Narrative 
 
Affirming the results of a flawed City of New Haven, Connecticut firefighter 
promotion examination,118 which disproportionately impacted African-American 
candidates in failures,119 the Court concluded that 
 
[R]ace based action like the City’s in this case is impermissible under 
Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence 
that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the 
disparate-impact statute. The respondents, we further determine, cannot 
meet that threshold standard. As a result, the City’s action in discarding 
the test was a violation of Title VII.120 
 
This means that voluntary compliance with Title VII will be overturned in the 
absence of a “strong basis in evidence” that an employer would be subject to 
disparate impact liability. In other words, disparate impact alone is insufficient to 
establish a Title VII claim. This directly contradicts the Court’s Title VII 
jurisprudence prior to its decision in Ricci.121 By importing Fourteenth Amendment 
principles into its Title VII jurisprudence, the Court creates a new and novel 
                                                   
117 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). Ricci is the first decision in the Court’s 
post-racial jurisprudence in which Justice Kennedy is the primary author. His concurrence 
in Parents Involved provided the decisive fifth vote to Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion, but 
he rejected the proposition that race should never be considered in public school assignments 
in elementary and secondary schools. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). While Parents Involved and Ricci are both process decisions, each advances 
liberal individualism and equal access, Justice Kennedy posits two distinct processual 
rationales. In his Parents Involved concurrence, Justice Kennedy notes that there is “a 
compelling interest . . . in avoiding racial isolation.” Id. Racial isolation and resegregation 
are process malfunctions, which should be corrected by the Court. See Powell, New 
Conceptions of Equality, supra note 15, at 271 n.88. This is a rare instance where the use of 
race is permissible “after other race neutral alternatives prove ineffective.” Id. at 271. Justice 
Kennedy rejects post-racial formalism in Parents Involved and embraces it in Ricci:  
 
Conversely, Ricci is all about equal results—a neutral result cannot be disturbed 
to guarantee a preferred racial outcome. Disparate impact—the fact that no 
African-American firefighter passed the promotion examination—is irrelevant 
because every eligible firefighter had an opportunity to pass the examination. 
There is no reference to racial isolation in the officer corps of firefighters, no 
acknowledgement of a history of exclusion with present day effects, and no 
mention of diversity in the employment ranks of firefighters in general. 
 
Powell, New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 15, at 273. 
118 Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 61, at 126–27,143.  
119 Powell, New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 15, at 259 n.26. 
120 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. 
121 Powell, New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 15, at 293–301. 
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threshold standard that will be virtually impossible to meet; it requires state 
employers to “anticipate” whether they will be subject to disparate impact litigation. 
There is no diversity interest here, and the Court is content with a promotion process 
that is slanted toward expanding a hyper segregated firefighter officer corps. 
The process is neutral and open because all firefighter officer candidates, 
regardless of race, have an equal opportunity to pass the examination. “So, racial 
disparity that negatively impacts African-Americans is ‘natural,’ and any burden on 
white privilege and settled entitlements is constitutionally suspect or a violation of 
Title VII.”122 Since there is no guarantee of proportionate racial results under the 
Court’s view of process, “[t]he Court concluded that the city engaged in disparate 
treatment (intentional discrimination) of the white and Latino firefighters who 
expected to be promoted based on the results of the exam.”123 Anti-discrimination 
law, whether under the Constitution or statute, has been framed to protect the 
expectancy interests of whites.124 
This proposition is graphically illustrated in how the Court privileges the 
individual narrative of Frank Ricci, the white lead plaintiff, whose rights were 
purportedly undermined by the decertification of the skewed examination results.125 
The rhetorical allure of post-racial process discourse highlights how the Court 
actively embraces reverse discrimination claims of whites, while discarding 
substantive discrimination claims advanced by people of color.126 All of the previous 
decisions are concerned, in varying degrees, with “balancing” any perceived 
incremental gains by African-Americans, based on race, with the burden on innocent 
whites.127 
Conversely, while Shelby County v. Holder128 adopts the post-racial balancing 
approach, it also advances a structural view of the political process, which starts 
from the premise that since African-Americans have amassed substantial “political 
power,” then there must be clearly identifiable current discrimination by the state to 
warrant any consideration of race.129 There is no constitutional right to “win” on the 
basis of race, only to participate equally. Since all citizens can “vote,” additional 
legislation and supervision of covered jurisdictions is unnecessary because “[t]he 
tests and devices that blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide 
for over 40 years.”130 Just as in the school desegregation decisions, there is no 
concern with retrogression or the present day effects of past discrimination. 
  
                                                   
122 Id. at 259 n.27.  
123 Id. at 259 (emphasis added). 
124 Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 61, at 81–82.  
125 IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS, HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE 
REINVENTIED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS, 143–44 (2014). 
126 James, supra note 84, at 482–83 (noting how the rhetorical trope of white innocence 
is employed by the Court to reject substantive race-conscious remedial measures). 
127 Id. 
128 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2616 (2013). 
129 Id. at 2625–29. 
130 Id. at 2625. 
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Post-racial discourse creates the myth of substantive equality by emphasizing 
formalism, access, and opportunity. As “appealing” as these neutral conceptions are, 
they nevertheless reinforce structural inequality. Indeed, the Court consistently 
chooses retrogression over voluntary compliance with anti-discrimination law.131 
 
4.  Shelby County: Contrived Federalism 
 
Advancing a novel federalism and equal sovereignty rationale132 for the 
proposition that covered jurisdictions133 should not be “burdened” by the substantive 
requirements of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”),134 the Court held that Section 4 of 
the Act was unconstitutional.135 Again, the rhetorical narrative of neutral political 
discourse is employed to justify inequality and retrogression. 
Just as it has done in its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in the school 
integration cases and Title VII in public employment cases,136 the Court has 
reconceptualized the VRA as merely a minimal procedural guarantee of access to 
participate in a race neutral process. Since formal discrimination by the states has 
been eliminated, then there must be current data of discrimination in voting rather 
than “decades-old data”137—“current burdens” on similarly situated states must be 
based on “current needs” to eradicate identifiable discrimination in a covered 
jurisdiction:138 
  
                                                   
131 Spann, supra note 111, at 607–08 (discussing the inherent racism underlying the 
Court’s post-racial constitutionalism, concluding that the Court perpetuates racial 
discrimination by actively protecting white majoritarian interests so that substantive equality 
is undermined).  
132 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624. 
133 Id. at 2619 (“covered” jurisdictions “were those States or political subdivisions that 
had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and had 
less than 50 percent voting registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election,” § 4(b), 
79 Stat. 438). 
134 Id. at 2623–31. 
135 Id. at 2631. 
136 See supra Part I.B.2–3. 
137 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629.  
138 Id. at 2622. 
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But history did not end in 1965. By the time the Act was reauthorized 
in 2006, there had been 40 more years of it. In assessing the “current need 
[]” for a preclearance system that treats States differently from one another 
today, that history cannot be ignored. During that time, largely because of 
the Voting Rights Act, voting tests were abolished, disparities in voter 
registration and turnout due to race were erased, and African-Americans 
attained political office in record numbers. And yet the coverage formula 
that Congress reauthorized in 2006 ignores these developments, keeping 
the focus on decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems, rather 
than current data reflecting current needs.139  
 
Because so much racial “progress” has been made in securing voting rights for 
African-Americans,140 any new burden that disrupts the concept of equal sovereignty 
amongst the states must be justified by current conditions that evince voting 
discrimination. The VRA differentiates between covered and noncovered states—
this conflicts with tenets of federalism and equal state sovereignty—preclearance 
requirements will be declared unconstitutional if there is no remedial basis for 
imposing such an extraordinary intrusion on state sovereignty.141 
This Court-created federalism fairytale insulates the present day effects of past 
discrimination in voting by simply recounting all of the “progress” that has been 
made,142 and concluding that any consideration of race in the coverage formula 
dooms Section 4 to constitutional oblivion. The democratic myth is particularly 
appealing here because the Constitution protects process, access, and individual 
opportunity, not a group right to win (or enhance political power) based on race.143  
Unifying Grutter, Parents Involved, Ricci, and Shelby County is the post-racial 
process discourse of equal opportunity. The Court’s process decisions advance 
several propositions: 
  
                                                   
139 Id. at 2628–29. 
140 Id. at 2625–26 (discussing progress made in covered jurisdictions in voter turnout 
and registration, and stating that blatant discrimination, like evasion of federal decrees, poll 
taxes, and literacy tests, is rare; and, that “minority candidates hold office at unprecedented 
levels.”). 
141 Id. at 2624. 
142 Kimberlé Crenshaw, The Court’s Denial of Racial Societal Debt, 40 HUM. RTHS. 
12, 13–14 (2013) (pinpointing the Court’s use of the post-racial narrative of progress, and 
how its celebratory tenor obscures the lingering vestiges of centuries of racial subjugation 
by focusing on formalistic equality, and leads to the dismantling of seminal anti-
discrimination legislation like the VRA). 
143 Terry Smith, White Backlash in a Brown Country, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 89, 97 (2015) 
(exploring the social dynamic of white backlash and how it animates rulings of the Roberts 
Court, and offering an insightful critique of the racial progress rationale as formalistic and 
linear). 
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1. The Court privileges reverse discrimination law suits; and, through its 
process decisions, advances a neutral rationale for the preservation of 
white privilege;144 
 
2. Anti-discrimination law is reinterpreted to protect neutral process 
values, and the Court will intervene whenever there is a substantive 
outcome that negatively impacts (or substantively burdens) the entitlement 
“rights” of whites;145 
 
3. Structural inequality146 does not exist because it cannot be proven with 
exacting particularity in the form of discriminatory intent;147 
 
4. Ostensibly positive, pluralistic values, essential to the American polity, 
like participation in the democratic process, voting, and interest group 
organization are skewed by the Court’s expansive interpretation of process 
access and cramped view of equality;148 and 
 
5. The electorate has a democratic “right” to define equality under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.149  
 
After significantly diluting, if not completely dismantling the edifice of anti-
discrimination law, the Court now endorses a deceptively neutral approach premised 
on a contrived participatory democracy model. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion 
in Schuette reads like a primer on democracy, post-racialism, and the First 
Amendment.  
 
                                                   
144 Mario L. Barnes, “The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination in a “Post-Race” World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043, 2067–100 (2016). 
145 Spann, supra note 111, at 607–08; Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 151, 216 (2016) (noting how the Roberts Court has reinterpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VII, to protect white privilege while simultaneously 
constructing nearly insurmountable proof barriers to advance anti-discrimination claims). 
146 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
147 Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and 
Origins of “the Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 943–44 (2008) 
(critiquing the discriminatory intent requirement).  
148 See Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 1530–33. Professor Robin Lenhardt has explored how 
the Court has inverted the categories of “good” and “bad” cities, with “good” cities being 
those that completely ignore race in their attempts to eradicate inequality, and “bad” cities 
being those that use race-conscious remedies to address the lingering effects of inequality. 
The Court prefers the post-racial discourse centered on the neutral attributes of democratic 
governance rather than a substantive approach to the eradication of racial subordination. The 
opinions in Schuette dramatically illustrate this post-racial doctrinal posture. 
149 See Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1636–37 
(2014). 
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II.  SCHUETTE AND THE DEMOCRATIC MYTH 
 
The preceding discussion focused on how public discourse is rooted in neutral 
principles that are particularly appealing to the Court, and how the Court translates 
these principles into normative propositions like equal access, opportunity, and 
process. Grutter, Parents Involved, Ricci, and Shelby County all involve the use of 
race to combat some form of societal retrogression and vestiges of formal 
subjugation, but the Court nevertheless transforms each of these decisions into an 
occasion to affirm reverse discrimination suits and dismiss any consideration of 
structural inequality.150 The Court’s race jurisprudence is premised on process 
values, liberal individualism, white victim-innocence narratives, and stringent proof 
requirements based upon the virtually illusive discriminatory intent.151  
Building upon this narrative and doctrinal connection, Part II highlights how 
the Court’s political process doctrine has evolved to advance its post-racial 
constitutionalism. The decisions that form the conceptual core of the Court’s 
political process doctrine all focus on some type of explicit governmental legislation 
or restructuring of the process that targets African-Americans for injury.152 Initially, 
it was “easy” for the Court to identify the alleged state discrimination on its face, 
but all of this changed with the advent of Washington v. Davis and the Court’s 
doctrinal allegiance to colorblind constitutionalism and later post-racial 
constitutionalism.153 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, all of the Court’s political process decisions 
represent, in varying forms, structural displacement. A central tenet of structural 
inequality is the displacement of discrete and insular minorities, those groups that 
are targeted for exclusion based upon a history of oppression with present day 
effects. These decisions illuminate how systemic exclusion is achieved explicitly or 
implicitly so that the neutral allure of “open” democratic decisionmaking becomes 
deceptively appealing. The Democratic Myth denotes the fact that while the rhetoric  
 
 
 
                                                   
150 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The 
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 615, 670–71.  
151 Id. at 664–68. 
152 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636 (plurality opinion) (“The question is not how to 
address or prevent injury caused on account of race but whether voters may determine 
whether a policy of race-based preferences should be continued.”); id. at 1640 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I would instead reaffirm that the ‘ordinary principles of our law [and] of our 
democratic heritage’ require ‘plaintiffs alleging equal protection violations’ stemming from 
facially neutral acts to ‘prove intent and causation and not merely the existence of racial 
disparity.’”); id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that there was no Equal Protection 
Clause violation because there was no restructuring of the political process to harm 
minorities).  
153 See supra notes 2 & 5 and accompanying text. 
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of direct democracy is inspiring, because it embraces neutral concepts like access, 
organization, and even “change,” the impact on the historically oppressed is 
devastating because it ratifies inequality by majority vote.154 
The Court rejected this distorted democracy rationale in Reitman, Hunter, and 
Washington v. Seattle, but it then elevated the discriminatory intent requirement to 
a threshold standard that virtually precludes relief.155 Crawford marks the beginning 
of this rigid analytical posture. Schuette is the doctrinal culmination of this 
conceptual shift.156 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Schuette advances the Court’s post-
racial constitutionalism by framing the analysis as not about the constitutionality of 
race-conscious remedies, but about whether “voters in the States may choose to 
prohibit consideration of racial preferences in governmental decisions, in particular 
with respect to school admissions.”157 The states as laboratories of democracy and 
experimentation158 is a particularly appealing rhetorical tool in the Court’s 
decision—the Court can exercise its judicial power cautiously in the name of the 
process and post-racial constitutionalism.  
The real danger is that the voters may choose to “experiment” in a manner that 
harms discrete and insular minorities by targeting them for displacement from the 
process. This is why it is particularly telling that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer 
v. Evans159 is not mentioned, analogized, or even distinguished in the Schuette 
plurality.160 Schuette alters the doctrinal core of the political process decisions. 
                                                   
154 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1978). 
155 Hutchinson, supra note 150, at 670–74 (discussing inversion of the intent 
requirement so that whites are protected as oppressed minorities, and people of color must 
meet a heightened level of proof under the guise of a neutral, fair, and colorblind process); 
Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 
43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1081 (2011) (“Absent proof of discriminatory purpose, the 
government is almost certain to prevail because it would receive only rational basis review 
[the most deferential tier of equal protection scrutiny]. Thus, the combination of the tiers of 
scrutiny and the requirement for a discriminatory purpose combine to immunize from 
judicial review countless government actions which create great social inequalities.”). 
Likewise, in Schuette, since there is no cognizable proof of discriminatory intent, the voter 
initiative is imbued with the presumption of validity, notwithstanding its impact in removing 
substantive race-conscious remedies from all sectors of public decisionmaking. 
156 While it is beyond the scope of this Article, the Schuette decision has been 
conceptualized as a paradigmatic example of moral exclusion—an implicit systemic bias 
toward historically oppressed groups—because majoritarian voter initiatives “create moral 
boundaries which are used to exclude others from equitable treatment and considerations of 
fairness.” McNeal, supra note 62, at 401. This is fundamental to the political restructuring 
wrought in Schuette.  
157 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630 (plurality opinion). 
158 Id. at 1636–38. 
159 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
160 See generally Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1670–71 (illustrating that Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion does not contain any reference to Romer v. Evans, however Justice Sotomayer’s 
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A.  The Political Process Doctrine and Discrete and Insular Minorities 
 
A central tension in constitutional jurisprudence is whether the Court should 
intervene in the legislative decisionmaking process, which is generally presumed to 
be functional, and render its opinion on the propriety of state action. This is the 
countermajoritarian difficulty;161 analytically, the Court resolves this antidemocratic 
problem through its multitiered approach to judicial review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.162 In the famous footnote four of the United States v. Carolene 
Products decision, the Court sets the nascent tiers of equal protection review: 
 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . It is unnecessary to consider now 
whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can 
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is 
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote . . . upon dissemination 
of information . . . on interferences with political organizations . . . as to 
prohibition of peaceable assembly . . . . Nor need we enquire whether 
similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at 
particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities . . . whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.163  
 
Starting from the pluralistic premise that the political process generally 
functions well, and that democracy truly means access, Carolene Products 
nevertheless identifies a narrow set of process circumstances when judicial 
intervention is not only permissible, but mandated by our constitutional structure.164 
                                                   
dissenting opinion does).  
161 Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to 
Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 363 (2008) (citing Alexander Bickel, 
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 
(1962) as the originator of this term, and discussing the literature).  
162 Hutchinson, supra note 150, at 633–34. 
163 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations 
omitted). 
164 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1281 (2005) (elaborating 
on the doctrinal contours of Carolene Products footnote four, and identifying instances 
where there is no strong presumption of constitutionality; specifically, laws targeting discrete 
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“[M]ore searching judicial inquiry”165 is called for when structural animus targets 
the politically powerless; most notably, racial minorities or others who have been 
historically excluded from participating in the process.166 It is clear that mere access 
is insufficient in such cases, because the process has been so fundamentally altered 
that it cannot be relied upon, certainly not by the excluded group, to correct itself.167 
In Democracy and Distrust, Professor John Hart Ely posits the Process Theory, 
in which he conceptualizes footnote four of Carolene Products to offer a rationale 
for judicial review based upon a representation-reinforcement theory:168 “The 
Process Theory, or representation-reinforcement rationale, does not address the 
present day effects of past discrimination—there is no substantive conception of 
equality because the Process Theory’s primary focus is on those ‘rare’ process 
malfunctions that impede access to the political process.”169 This forward-looking 
approach obscures the complexity of structural inequality and the present day effects 
of past discrimination. The same doctrinal and conceptual limitations are inherent in 
the Court’s political process decisions. 
The malleable factors of the political process doctrine allow it to be 
manipulated by the Court to reinforce post-racial process discourse as an explanation 
for the reversal of substantive race-conscious remedial approaches.170 This means 
that instead of interpreting and enforcing the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
some of that responsibility has now been given to the electorate to determine the 
efficacy of race-conscious affirmative action and the very substance of the 
antisubordination principle. The post-racial process discourse outlined above171 is 
the rhetorical underpinning of voter initiatives, which seek to define equality by 
popular majority vote.172  
                                                   
and insular minorities for exclusion and unequal treatment). 
165 Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
166 David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1257 
(discrete and insular minorities are those “groups that are not able to play their proper role 
in democratic politics. They are ‘discrete’ in the sense that they are separate in some way, 
identifiable as distinct from the rest of society. They are ‘insular’ in the sense that other 
groups will not form coalitions with them—and, critically, not because of a lack of common 
interests but because of ‘prejudice.’”). 
167 Id. at 1257–58 (“But if a group has been silenced . . . or not allowed to play the 
game . . . then the process is not working as it should. Then the courts have a role to play, 
because the self-correcting properties of democratic politics will be nullified, and only the 
courts can make the democratic process work as it should.”). 
168 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101–
03, 146 (1980) (arguing that The Court should unblock any stoppages in the system, and 
should function as a referee to the process, not an evaluator of the substance of rights or 
issues). 
169 Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality, supra note 11, at 827 n.15.  
170 Hutchinson, supra note 45, at 927 (“Race-based remedies harm and alienate 
innocent whites and give blacks a special or preferential status.”). This narrative is essential 
to the Court’s post-racial determinism. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
171 See supra Part I. 
172 Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which 
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All of the political process decisions deal with structural animus aimed directly 
against one quintessential discrete and insular minority—African-Americans.173 In 
Reitman v. Mulkey, the state stands behind a private right to discriminate in 
housing;174 Hunter v. Erickson involves an explicit racial classification that treats 
housing matters differently based on race, thereby placing a “special burden” on 
African-Americans;175 the companion cases of Washington v. Seattle176 and 
Crawford v. Board of Education of Los Angeles177 raise analytical problems because 
the Court begins to erect an intent requirement which dramatically transforms how 
harm is conceptualized when the political process is restructured;178 and, finally, 
while Romer v. Evans179 is generally not theorized as a political process decision, it 
is because it involves yet another discrete and insular minority (the LGBTQ 
community), and an attempt, by the state, through ostensibly neutral legislation, to 
exclude such a disfavored minority.180  
This is structural animus. Schuette is the latest case in this line of decisions, and 
it erroneously expands the formalistic intent distinction that the Court creates to 
distinguish the results in Seattle and Crawford.  
 
1.  Reitman v. Mulkey: Rejection of Neutrality 
 
California voters passed Proposition 14, a statewide initiative, which added 
Article I, Section 26 to the state constitution, and provided that: 
 
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, 
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is 
willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, 
to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as 
he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.181 
                                                   
Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 399, 514–15 (1999) 
(critiquing rhetorical allure of direct democracy-voter initiative movements, and discussing 
the heightened risks of exclusion from the process through (i) toxic rhetoric; (ii) “we-they” 
thinking; (iii) manipulation of issues through slanted framing (“special rights” or 
“preferences” that harm innocent whites); and (iv) “cultural-ideological initiatives set up a 
scenario where majorities cast votes on the minorities’ very membership in the polity, and 
where the minorities almost always lose.”). 
173 Straus, supra note 166, at 1258. 
174 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967). 
175 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969). 
176 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982). 
177 458 U.S. 527, 543 (1982). 
178 Id. at 537–38 (upholding, as a mere repeal of race-related legislation, Proposition I, 
and stating that “when a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial 
minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be 
shown.”). 
179 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
180 Id. at 635–36. 
181 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 371 (1967) (quoting ART. I, § 26 CA. CONST.). 
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Construing the “immediate objective,”182 “ultimate effect,”183 and “historical 
context”184 underlying the enactment of section 26, the Court concluded, 
“Proposition 14 invalidly involved the State in racial discriminations in the housing 
market.”185 By giving individuals the “absolute discretion” to “decline to sell . . . to 
such persons as he . . . chooses,”186 “the State had taken affirmative action designed 
to make private discriminations legally possible.”187 
What is striking here is that the Court rejects the neutral language of Proposition 
14, and concludes that it nevertheless constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Moreover, there is no formalistic discriminatory intent requirement.188 To 
the Court, there was no other conceivable basis “for an application of Section 26 
aside from authorizing the perpetration of a purported private discrimination.”189 
Because Section 26 overturned “laws that bore on the right of private sellers and 
lessors to discriminate,”190 and created a “constitutional right to privately 
discriminate”191 the Court held that this was unconstitutional state action.192 In its 
analysis, the Court acknowledged that there was a “range of situations in which 
discriminatory state action has been identified.”193 This is more of a process view, 
because the Court recognizes that there is an ultimate effect and impact to this 
deceptively neutral legislation.194 Thus, Reitman establishes the important 
proposition that political process cases are fact specific, and the analytical inquiry 
should focus on the ultimate effect, impact, and context.195 
 
2.  Hunter v. Erickson: Explicit Racial Classification 
 
Unlike the purportedly race neutral legislation in Reitman, there was an explicit 
racial classification that treated housing matters differently based on race.196 
Specifically, the City of Akron, Ohio amended the city charter “to prevent the city 
council from implementing any ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral 
                                                   
182 Id. at 373. 
183 Id. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 375. 
186 Id. at 388. 
187 Id. at 375. 
188 Id. (noting “a prohibited state involvement could be found ‘even where the state can 
be charged with only encouraging’ rather than commanding discrimination.”). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 374. 
191 Id. (emphasis omitted) 
192 Id. at 380–81. 
193 Id. at 380. 
194 Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Colorado’s Amendment 2 Defeated: The Emergence of a 
Fundamental Right to Participate in the Political Process, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 841, 872 
(1995). 
195 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 373, 378–80. 
196 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969). 
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discrimination in housing without the approval of the majority of the voters of 
Akron.”197 Here, the effect of this amendment is even more damaging than that in 
Reitman because it “not only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance 
forbidding housing discrimination, but also required the approval of the [majority 
of] electors before any future ordinance could take effect.”198 This fundamental 
altering of the process was unconstitutional.199 
This meant that the fair housing ordinance was unavailable to plaintiffs because 
of the amended city charter;200 indeed, any future anti-discrimination ordinance had 
to “first be approved by a majority of electors.”201 Section 137, the amendment to 
Akron’s City Charter, suspended the extant anti-discrimination housing ordinance 
and curtailed any subsequent remedial legislation in the absence of approval by the 
electors.202 The fact that “implementation of this change”203 occurred “through 
popular referendum”204 did not “immunize it”205 from strict scrutiny.206  
Section 137 made enactment of anti-discrimination housing ordinances 
“substantially more difficult,”207 and its ostensibly neutral tenor belies the fact that 
it explicitly targeted fair housing ordinances for suspension:  
 
Only laws to end housing discrimination based on “race, color, 
religion, national origin or ancestry” must run § 137’s gantlet. It is true 
that the section draws no distinctions among racial and religious groups. 
Negroes and whites, Jews and Catholics are all subject to the same 
requirements if there is housing discrimination against them which they 
wish to end. But §137 nevertheless disadvantages those who would benefit 
from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as against 
those who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise 
regulate the real estate market in their favor. 
. . . 
Moreover, although the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew 
and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law’s impact falls 
on the minority. . . . [Section] 137 places special burdens on racial 
minorities within the governmental process. This is no more permissible 
than denying them the vote, on an equal basis with others.208 
 
                                                   
197 Id. at 386. 
198 Id. at 389–90. 
199 Id. at 393. 
200 Id. at 387. 
201 Id. at 397. 
202 Id. at 389–90.  
203 Id. at 392. 
204 Id.  
205 Id. at 392.  
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 390. 
208 Id. at 390–91. 
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Here again, impact is significant. It is how the process is structured, designed, 
and implemented that impacts African-Americans and places a “special burden” on 
them so that there is no real chance of effective redress because the law in place has 
been suspended, and any other legislation must be approved by a majority of a 
hostile electorate. To the Court, this is akin to the denial of the right to vote—the 
manner in which the process is rigged ensures that anti-discrimination claims, like 
diluted or suppressed votes, will not be heard. “The Hunter case established the 
bedrock principle that a state may not restructure the procedures [or process] of the 
government for the purpose of targeting racial minorities, even if the manner is 
facially neutral.”209 Here, the law specifically targeted race, and it restructured the 
process in a manner that placed a special burden on African-Americans (a discrete 
and insular minority). 
 
3.  Washington v. Seattle and Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los 
Angeles: Restructuring the Process? 
 
The doctrinal shift210 that sets the stage for Schuette and its underlying 
democratic myth is the Court’s drawing of the rigid de jure/de facto distinction in 
Washington v. Seattle and Crawford. It should be noted that these cases were decided 
during the Court’s wholesale retreat from school integration211 and its strict 
adherence to the discriminatory intent requirement in Washington v. Davis.212 The 
analysis in the political process decisions changes from how the process impacts 
minorities to whether there is discriminatory intent to establish an equal protection 
claim. This explains the incongruent result in Crawford.213 
Until the Crawford decision, all the political process decisions had held that 
targeting discrete and insular minorities for exclusion from the political process was 
unconstitutional. This structural animus is not tolerated under the Equal Protection 
Clause. Yet, Crawford erects the discriminatory intent requirement as the touchstone 
of constitutional analysis, raising the bar of proof and discounting the significance 
of structural impact, which unified all of the pre-Crawford decisions.214 
  
                                                   
209 McNeal, supra note 62, at 390. 
210 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
212 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
213 Decided the same day, the Court holds the voter initiative unconstitutional in Seattle, 
and constitutional in Crawford. This is an example of the limits of the Court’s doctrinal 
formalism. 
214 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law In An Age of Proportionality, 124 
YALE L.J. 3094, 3183 (2015) (noting that disparate impact on historically oppressed groups 
may be a signal of a process failure, and concluding that “[d]isparate impacts that adversely 
burden minority groups might be regarded as of greater constitutional concern than ‘disparate 
impact’ harms to members of a majority—if not on a substantive theory of racial 
nonsubordination then on an evidentiary theory that such disparate impacts are likely to result 
from bias, whether conscious or not.”). 
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Recognizing the connection between segregated housing and racially isolated 
schools, the Seattle School District sought to advance integrated schools through 
transfer programs and magnet schools.215 These efforts proved unsuccessful, and the 
District implemented the “Seattle Plan,” which used busing and mandatory 
reassignments to dismantle segregated schools, and to prevent retrogression in the 
form of resegregation.216 Citizens opposed to the desegregation plan formed a group 
called Citizens for Voluntary Integration Committee (“CiVIC”).217 CiVIC “drafted 
a statewide initiative designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing for purposes 
of racial integration.”218 Initiative 350 provided that “no school board . . . shall 
directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the school 
which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student’s place of 
residence . . . and which offers the course of study pursued by such student.”219 
The Seattle School District, along with the districts of Tacoma and Pasco, filed 
suit against Washington State alleging that Initiative 350 violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.220 Affirming the district court’s 
holding that Initiative 350 violated the Equal Protection Clause and the principle set 
out in Hunter, the Court concluded that the initiative “uses the racial nature of an 
issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, thus imposing 
substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.”221  
Thus, Initiative 350 was much more than a “simple repeal or modification of 
desegregation or antidiscrimination laws.”222 Here, the burden was on any and “all 
future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts throughout the State, by 
lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a new and remote level of 
government.”223 Authority over desegregation efforts was moved from the local 
board to the state level, and this fundamental structural reordering of the 
decisionmaking process “differentiat[ed] between the treatment of problems 
involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in the same area.”224 That  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
215 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 460–61 (1982). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 461–62. It is ironic that a group opposed to integration would call itself a 
“voluntary” integration committee. This illustrates the public discourse outlined in Section 
I, and the rhetorical allure of direct democracy movements. See Vargas, supra note 172.  
218 Seattle, 458 U.S. at 462. 
219 Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981)). 
220 Id. at 464. 
221 Id. at 470. 
222 Id. at 483. This is the proposition that the Court employed to distinguish the result 
in Crawford. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539; accord Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1636–37 (2014). 
223 Seattle, 458 U.S. at 483. 
224 Id. at 480. 
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is, there is something so inherently discriminatory about this restructuring of the 
process that it is unexplainable on any other grounds except race.225 The 
restructuring is designed specifically to burden minority interests.226 
Stating that the Court has “not insisted on a particularized inquiry into 
motivation in all equal protection cases,”227 it held that Initiative 350 was the type 
of legislation that, like Section 137 in Hunter, falls within “an inherently suspect 
category.”228 This is significant because the Court noted that Washington v. Davis 
did not overturn Hunter.229 
Discriminatory intent, then, is not the touchstone, but how the process targets 
race-conscious anti-discrimination legislation and reallocates the structure of the 
process to burden minority interests. This is tantamount to rigging the process 
against discrete and insular minorities—the allocation of power “places unusual 
burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically designed to 
overcome the ‘special condition’ of prejudice.”230 Indeed, Initiative 350 all but 
guarantees continued isolation in the form of segregated neighborhood schools,231 
and it makes change within the process unusually difficult (and perhaps impossible) 
for minorities and desegregation advocates who want to pursue integrated schools. 
Participation, like the right to vote, must be meaningful.232 There is no way that 
minorities can be successful under the reconfigured decisionmaking process. Thus, 
Initiative 350 is unconstitutional. 
By contrast, although under similar facts and decided the same day, Crawford 
comes out with a completely different result. In Crawford, the issue, to the Court, 
was not how the process was structured; but, rather whether a state may recede in its 
remedial efforts after it chooses to do more than required under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.233 The Court concluded that the state’s “democratic processes” and 
                                                   
225 See Hutchinson, supra note 150. 
226 Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485 (“But when the political process . . . used to address racially 
conscious legislation—and only such legislation—is singled out for peculiar and 
disadvantageous treatment, the government action plainly ‘rests on distinctions based on 
race.’”).  
227 Id.  
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 484–85. 
230 Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 
(1938)). 
231 Sean Riley, How Seattle Gave Up on Busing and Allowed its Public Schools to 
Become Alarmingly Resegregated, THE STRANGER (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.thestranger. 
com/feature/2016/04/13/23945368/how-seattle-gave-up-on-busing-and-allowed-its-public-
schools-to-become-alarmingly-resegregated [https://perma.cc/ZFB6-PJ2A]; see Nikole 
Hannah Jones, Worlds Apart: How My Daughter’s School Became a Battleground Over 
Which of New York’s Children Benefit from a Separate and Unequal System, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 2016, at 34. 
232 See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 487; Grauerholz, supra note 194, at 905 (discussing a 
fundamental right to equal political participation). 
233 Crawford v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 535 (1982). 
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ability to experiment with race-conscious policies allow it to do just that.234 This is 
the democratic myth that will be the foundation of the Schuette decision thirty-two 
years later. 
Voters ratified Proposition I, an amendment to the California Constitution, 
which confirmed “the power of state courts to order busing to that exercised by the 
federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment.”235 Proposition I provided that: 
 
[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of California or 
any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with 
respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) 
except to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also 
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal 
court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that 
obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .236 
 
Concluding that Proposition I was constitutional because it was race neutral 
and simply “embrace[d] the requirements of the federal constitution with respect to 
mandatory school assignments and transportation,”237 the Court then references the 
discriminatory intent requirement as a constitutional prerequisite to a finding of a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.238 In the absence of a constitutional 
violation (de jure segregation), state courts are forbidden to order pupil school 
assignment or pupil transportation.239 
California’s constitution places an affirmative constitutional obligation on the 
school board to eliminate segregation whether its origin is de facto or de jure.240 This 
is more expansive than the Federal Constitution’s narrow prohibition of de jure 
segregation.241 Proposition I, which addresses a racial matter in a neutral fashion, 
merely “repeals” the previously expansive interpretation of remediable segregation 
under the California Constitution;242 and, the State “having gone beyond the 
requirements of the Federal Constitution, . . . return[s] in part to the standard 
prevailing generally throughout the United States.”243 
                                                   
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 532. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 535. 
238 Id. at 537–38. 
239 Id. at 537. 
240 Id. at 530. 
241 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schls. v. Seattle Schl. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 720–21 (2007) (noting the “compelling interest of remedying the effects of past 
intentional discrimination”). 
242 Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538–39. 
243 Id. at 542. The Court noted, “the Proposition simply removes one means of 
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It is difficult to explain how the Court reaches two completely different 
conclusions in Seattle and Crawford.244 Both cases involve fundamental reorderings 
of the process: in Seattle, decisionmaking power was moved to the state level, adding 
a nearly insurmountable barrier to access for discrete and insular minorities;245 in 
Crawford, the process was restructured to limit the equitable powers of courts to 
order remedies to dismantle segregated schools and prevent resegregation.246 
Notwithstanding their neutral rhetoric, both initiatives targeted race-conscious 
remedies, and sought to either prohibit (Seattle) or severely limit the scope of such 
remedies (Crawford). 
To the Court, Seattle and Crawford are distinguishable based upon the 
formalistic de jure/de facto distinction. In Seattle, the restructuring of the political 
process is unconstitutionally overbroad because it removes mandatory busing as a 
remedy for even “school boards that had engaged in de jure segregation” in the 
absence of a court order.247 Conversely, in Crawford, since there is merely de facto 
                                                   
achieving the state-created right to desegregated education. School districts retain the 
obligation to alleviate segregation regardless of cause. And the state courts still may order 
desegregation measures other than pupil assignment or pupil transportation.” Id. at 544. Of 
course, the Court never explains the scope of this limited remedial power: on the one hand, 
it appears that there is a continuing state constitutional obligation to eradicate de facto 
segregation, but pupil assignment and transportation plans can only be ordered by the courts 
upon a finding of discriminatory intent. Resegregation is constitutionally irrelevant, but the 
Court is indifferent to this because the state constitution still “places upon school boards a 
greater duty to desegregate than does the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 541. Justice 
Marshall forcefully rejects this make-weight premise: “The fact that mandatory pupil 
reassignment was still available as a remedy for de jure segregation did not alter the 
conclusion that an unconstitutional reallocation of power had occurred with respect to those 
seeking to combat de facto racial isolation in the public schools.” Id. at 554 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
244 Spann, supra note 2, at 250–51. 
245 Washington v. Seattle Schl. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474–75 (1982). 
246 Crawford, 458 U.S. at 548 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Professor Laurence Tribe 
observes, Seattle and Crawford are essentially the same type of case, each restructuring the 
political process to harm minorities; but, justifying the result in Crawford as a mere “repeal” 
of a state created right to desegregated education: 
 
[T]he change wrought by Proposition 1 [in Crawford] was strikingly analogous 
to that wrought by Initiative 350 [in Seattle] or by the Hunter charter amendment. 
In Crawford the shift in authority was from the courts to the state legislature or 
electorate; in Seattle, from the local school board to the state legislature or the 
electorate; in Hunter, from the city council to the city electorate. The majority and 
concurring opinions in Crawford misconstrued the impact of Proposition 1 
because of confusion over just what “right” was at issue. What was at stake was 
not some sort of derivative “right to invoke a judicial busing remedy,” but a state-
guaranteed “right to be free from racial isolation in the public schools.” 
 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1487 (2d ed. 1988). 
247 Seattle, 458 U.S. at 466. 
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segregation (or no state mandated discrimination), then the state is free to merely 
“repeal” a remedial policy that went beyond that mandated under the Federal 
Constitution, which only prohibits de jure segregation. Crawford was wrongly 
decided. Under the political process doctrine, Seattle and Crawford are the same 
case: both restructure the process in a manner that perpetuates the subjugation of 
discrete and insular minorities, but their divergent results are premised on the 
outcome determinative de jure/de facto distinction. 
Reitman, Hunter, Seattle, and Crawford are the same type of case—they all 
reallocate decisionmaking power unconstitutionally by codifying inequality and 
insulating it from judicial review.248 That is, they leave any progressive social 
change to the electorate, which is against race-conscious remedial approaches to 
fulfill the antisubordination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.249 Romer v. 
Evans250 fits squarely within this line of decisions as well. For while it is generally 
conceived as a case about legislative animus,251 there is nevertheless a structural 
dynamic to it that makes it particularly salient to the analysis here. 
 
4.  Romer v. Evans and the Political Process Doctrine 
 
Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution was adopted in 1992 in a statewide 
referendum.252 It provided that: 
  
                                                   
248 Crawford, 458 U.S. at 558–61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
249 See Spann, supra note 2, at 278; Chin, supra note 3, at 33; see also supra notes 2–3 
and accompanying text. 
250 517 U.S. 618 (1996). 
251 Spann, supra note 2, at 250 n.270. Perhaps this explains why Justice Kennedy, the 
author of the Romer decision, fails to cite, quote, or analogize Romer in his Schuette plurality 
opinion. It could also be because the Court based its decision in Romer on a different 
rationale, brushing aside the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding, applying strict scrutiny, that 
the amendment to the Colorado Constitution was unconstitutional under the reasoning of the 
Court’s political process doctrine decisions. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 
1993). There are some direct doctrinal linkages between the political process doctrine 
(Hunter et. al.) and Schuette. See Stephen M. Rich, Ruling by Numbers: Political 
Restructuring and the Reconsideration of Democratic Commitments After Romer v. Evans, 
109 YALE L.J. 587, 615 (1999). 
252 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
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No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual 
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or 
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities 
or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, 
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, 
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis 
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority 
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This 
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.253 
 
This comprehensive amendment repealed anti-discrimination ordinances in 
Aspen, Boulder, and Denver; and, beyond the repeal, Amendment 2 prohibited “all 
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government 
designed to protect” members of the LGBTQ community.254 
The Court reaches two dramatically different results in Crawford 255 and Romer 
on what is essentially the same type of structural exclusion. In Crawford, 
“Proposition I works an unconstitutional reallocation of state power by depriving 
California courts of the ability to grant meaningful relief to those seeking to 
vindicate the State’s guarantee against de facto segregation in the public schools.”256 
The reallocation of state power is even more pervasive and pernicious in Romer, as 
Amendment 2 “nullifies specific legal protections for this targeted class [LGBTQ] 
in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare 
services, private education, and employment.”257 Amendment 2’s reach extends 
beyond the private sphere “to repeal and forbid all laws or policies providing specific 
protections for gays or lesbians from discrimination by every level of Colorado 
government.”258 
Nevertheless, the Court held Proposition I constitutional in Crawford, and 
Amendment 2 unconstitutional in Romer. Not only does this illustrate the 
elusiveness of the Court’s political process doctrine, it denotes the rigid formalism 
of the de jure/de facto distinction and the intent requirement.259 What is striking 
                                                   
253 Id. at 624. 
254 Id. 
255 Crawford was wrongly decided—its holding should have been in line with the 
Court’s holdings in Seattle, Reitman, Hunter, and Romer. See supra Part II.A.1–4. 
256 Crawford v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 554 (1982) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
257 Romer, 517 U.S. at 629. 
258 Id. (emphasis added). 
259 Rich, supra note 251, at 615 (distinguishing Amendment 2 in Romer from Hunter 
and its progeny by noting that it was “an especially pernicious kind of political restructuring” 
because it targeted a discrete and insular minority for disadvantage). All of the voter 
initiatives addressed by the Court from Reitman through Crawford deal with some form of 
“neutral” classification that impacts race (“the impartial category of race”) while Romer’s 
“partial category” is premised on an explicit classification of LGBTQ status. This 
discriminatory classification is based upon the State’s argument that it is merely leveling the 
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about Romer is that the Court, per Justice Kennedy’s opinion, does not require a 
showing of discriminatory intent, but rather focuses on the impact and restructuring 
of the process through the Colorado constitutional amendment. The Court does not 
recognize LGBTQ as a suspect class,260 so rationality of the process is the analytical 
focal point.261 The animus is inherent in the process itself, but this analysis is 
qualitatively different when it comes to race. The shift is noticeably from impact (in 
Romer) to intent (in Schuette).262 
What the Court misses is that Romer is yet another form of political 
restructuring with direct implications to its analysis in Schuette. Rather, the Court 
disconnects Romer from its political process jurisprudence, elevates the intent 
requirement so that Schuette is more of a post-racial decision263 than a structural 
process decision, and creates a myth of democratic participation and 
experimentation that belies the complexity of race, racism, and retrogression.  
Indeed, Professor Susannah W. Pollvogt pinpoints this glaring doctrinal 
contradiction when she notes that the Colorado amendment in Romer would be 
upheld as constitutional under the Schuette analysis.264 This doctrinal disparity is all 
the more disconcerting given that Justice Kennedy is the author of Romer and 
Schuette. 
Perhaps the Court is more adept at recognizing “new” discrimination and less 
so when it comes to “old” discrimination—discrimination is presumed in Romer, 
and race is viewed skeptically in Schuette.265 That is, the Court conceptualizes injury 
                                                   
playing field by removing “special” protections for LGBTQ citizens. Id. at 616; see Romer, 
517 U.S. at 626. The Court forcefully rejected this assertion because it recognized the explicit 
classification as a rank form of legislative animus. Id. at 632. 
260 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
261 Id. at 632 (Amendment 2 fails rational basis review because it is a “broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single group,” and its enactment cannot be explained by 
anything except animus toward LGBTQ). 
262 Spann, supra note 2, at 303 n.500. 
263 See supra Part I.B. 
264 Susanna W. Pollvogt, Thought Experiment: What If Justice Kennedy Had 
Approached Romer v. Evans the Way He Approached Schuette v. BAMN? (May 13, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436616 [https://perma.cc/LG38-27NA] (noting that the divergent 
results in Romer and Schuette can be explained as the Court being adept at identifying “new” 
discrimination like sexual orientation discrimination, and less so with old, “second 
generation discrimination” like racial discrimination); see Robinson, supra note 145, at 226 
(noting that Justice Kennedy’s Schuette plurality opinion leaves open the possibility of 
overruling Grutter, and concluding that the Schuette rationale should logically lead to the 
conclusion that Romer is not constitutionally viable as well). See generally Susannah W. 
Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012) (providing a detailed 
account of the Court’s animus analysis in Romer). 
265 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and 
Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 44 (2017) (concluding that the Court is unlikely to alter 
its post-racial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a shift in public 
opinion about race, and stating that “while the Court decided the sexual-orientation dignity 
cases as public attitudes concerning LGBT rights shifted rapidly towards greater acceptance 
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differently in the two cases: in Romer, the injury is borne out by the explicit language 
of exclusion in amendment 2, and the underlying structural animus that it represents 
against the LGBTQ community; on the other hand, there is no injury in Schuette 
because the electorate chose to reorder the political process (and any exclusion or 
burden has been voted on and approved). The failure to reconcile these decisions 
underscores the Court’s flawed reliance on post-racial process discourse. 
There are several distinct doctrinal propositions underlying the Court’s political 
process jurisprudence: 
 
1. Neutral rationales for the restructuring of the political decisionmaking 
process should be inherently suspect when the rights of the historically 
oppressed are targeted for unequal treatment;266 
 
2. A State cannot place its imprimatur behind an ostensibly neutral 
legislative enactment, which actually targets and excludes African-
Americans by promoting a private “right” to discriminate;267  
 
3. The political process cannot be reconfigured, by moving 
decisionmaking authority to another level of government, so that 
substantive access is denied and participation becomes so meaningless that 
it is akin to vote dilution;268 
  
                                                   
and tolerance, similar changes have not occurred with respect to public attitudes concerning 
substantive racial equality.”). It is not an overstatement to conclude, in the context of our 
times, that this shift may never occur. 
266 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 379–80 (1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 
385, 391–93 (1969). 
267 See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374. 
268 See Washington v. Seattle Schl. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 482–83 (1982); David B. 
Oppenheimer, Color-Blindness, Racism-Blindness, and Racism-Awareness: Revisiting 
Judge Henderson’s Proposition 209 Decision, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 229, 
237 (2011) (noting that restructuring could be “tantamount to vote dilution.”). 
 
The fatal defect in each of these three cases [Hunter, Seattle, and Romer] was the 
restructuring of the political process in a way that required a disadvantaged group 
to take some extraordinary action—obtaining a charter amendment, ballot 
initiative or state constitutional amendment—in order to protect its political 
interests, while those who opposed the interests of the disadvantaged group could 
have their way simply by utilizing the ordinary political process. 
  
Spann, supra note 2, at 250. 
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4. Anti-discrimination laws cannot be limited or nullified so that the 
disproportionate impact of structural inequality falls on racial minorities, 
and places on them “special burdens . . . within the governmental 
process”;269 
 
5. The mere fact that the restructuring of the decisionmaking process was 
reached by a popular voter referendum (or other “direct democracy” 
initiative) does not insulate the disproportionate impact on minorities from 
judicial review;270 and 
 
6. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees more than superficial access to 
the political process, it guarantees meaningful access and full 
participation,271 so that the deck is not stacked against African-Americans 
and other historically oppressed people of color.  
 
Schuette departs from firmly established precedent and the common doctrinal 
threads connecting Reitman, Hunter, Seattle, and Romer. Conflating the process 
values espoused in its equal opportunity/equal access decisions,272 the Court 
reinterprets the political process doctrine so that it now resembles all of the Court’s 
post-racial jurisprudence. That is, unless there is discriminatory intent manifested by 
the state itself, there is nothing to remedy.273 The Court conceptualizes Schuette as 
simply about benefits and burdens.274 Since African-Americans have received a 
tainted racial benefit or “preference,” the polity is free to take it back. Moreover, 
issues like diversity and race, although “sensitive” societal issues, are properly 
consigned to the ebb and flow of the democratic process.275 After all, democracy is 
a great experiment. As Schuette demonstrates, this experiment will have grave 
consequences for historically oppressed minorities. 
 
B.  Post-racial Constitutionalism 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment is inverted in Schuette for it stands for the 
counterintuitive proposition that states, through their electorate, can amend their 
constitutions to limit the reach of the antisubordination principle. The Court 
endorses voter initiatives to enact legislative amendments that preclude the 
consideration of race in any state decisionmaking process notwithstanding the 
                                                   
269 See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–34 (1996). 
270 See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392. 
271 See id. at 393; Grauerholz, supra note 194, at 905. 
272 See supra Part I.B. 
273 See Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1647 
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
274 See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L. J. 1, 
68–69 (1995). 
275 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638. 
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Court’s holding in Grutter and Fisher.276 Race is not inherently neutral, so it is 
appropriate for the citizenry to ban its use in the name of post-racialism.277 This is 
the narrative core of the Roberts Court’s race jurisprudence. In the absence of 
identifiable discrimination, race-conscious remedies are constitutionally prohibited; 
and, diversity, as one of many factors in admissions, cannot be considered in 
Michigan.278 
To bring doctrinal uniformity to its rigid formalism, the Court conceptualizes 
Schuette as a case about the democratic process, neutral results, and the virtues of 
participating in direct democracy movements279 rather than a case about the structure 
of the process itself. Of course, in the midst of this comprehensive primer on 
democracy and the First Amendment, there is no mention of this new gloss on the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This is the New Equal Protection,280 and it is advanced 
through the rhetorical allure of post-racial discourse and the democratic myth. 
 
1.  Justice Kennedy’s Post-Racial Proceduralism 
 
In 2006, Michigan voters adopted an amendment to the state constitution 
prohibiting consideration of race in government decisionmaking.281 Ballot 
proposal 2 passed by a vote of 58% to 42%, and became Article I, Section 26 of the 
Michigan Constitution when it was enacted.282 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
sitting en banc, concluded that, under the principles articulated in Seattle,283 the state 
constitutional amendment was unconstitutional.284 Reversing the Court of Appeals, 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion advances a central tenet of post-racial 
constitutionalism—post-racial proceduralism, the notion that it is the process itself 
that shapes the substance of constitutional rights.285 
The Schuette plurality sets out three post-racial propositions: (i) neutrality is 
the guiding principle of the Court’s analysis of race—so that the decision is not about 
race at all, but whether “racial preferences”286 may be prohibited by Michigan voters 
through the political process;287 (ii) the political process decisions288 are unified by 
                                                   
276 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
277 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636. 
278 See id. at 1638. 
279 See id. at 1637–38. 
280 See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 
748 (2011) (discussing the shift from a group rights paradigm to a liberty-based conception 
as a means to alleviate balkanization and “pluralism anxiety”). 
281 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629. 
282 Id. 
283 See supra Part II.A.3. 
284 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630. 
285 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
286Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630. 
287 Id. 
288 See supra Part II.A.1–4. 
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the requirement of discriminatory intent under the Fourteenth Amendment;289 and 
(iii) citizen involvement in the democratic process means that voters have a unique 
opportunity to advance legislation that not only mirrors the post-racial discourse of 
the polity,290 but incorporates it into the text of the state constitution. 
It is extraordinary that Justice Kennedy begins his analysis by proclaiming that 
this case “is not about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious 
admissions in higher education.”291 Fisher, of course, remains intact doctrinally in 
jurisdictions outside of Michigan,292 and stands for the proposition that 
“consideration of race in admissions is permissible”293 if race-neutral alternatives 
prove ineffective in attaining diversity. Schuette is most certainly about race—it is 
about whether the Michigan electorate can determine the scope and applicability of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in state decisionmaking, and thereby prohibit the use of 
race as a factor in such decisions. It seems odd that the Court would expand the 
interpretive powers of the citizenry in this manner, particularly since it is “the 
province and duty of [the Court] to say what the law is,”294 in interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on state power.295 
  
                                                   
289 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632–34. In order to advance this novel proposition, the Court 
reinterprets Seattle. See supra Part II.A.3. 
290 See supra Part I.A–B. 
291 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630.  
292 Meera E. Deo, Faculty Insights on Educational Diversity, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3115, 3122 (2015) (noting that Schuette left diversity in place while diluting affirmative 
action more broadly). 
293 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630. 
294 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); Joshua J. Schroeder, America’s 
Written Constitution: Remembering the Judicial Duty to Say What the Law Is, 43 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 833, 860 (2015). 
295 This is an interesting strand of federalism with state electorates determining the very 
parameters of a constitutional amendment intended to limit discrimination by the state. See 
Thomas D. Kimball, Schuette v. BAMN: The Short-Lived Return of the Ghost of Federalism 
Past, 61 LOY. L. REV. 365, 397 (2015) (discussing how Schuette promotes the flawed notion 
that voter-initiatives that result in legislative enactments are insulated from review by federal 
courts); see also Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored But Broadly Compelling: Defending 
Race-Conscious Admissions After Fisher, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 761, 766–67 (2015). 
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Conflating the holdings of Hunter, Reitman, and Seattle, Justice Kennedy erects 
a discriminatory intent requirement where one did not previously exist. Before 
Justice Kennedy’s reinterpretation of Seattle, all the political process doctrine 
decisions stood for the proposition that voter initiated legislation that “places [a] 
special[] burden[] on racial minorities”296 is constitutionally invalid. Concluding that 
this reading of the cases, particularly Seattle, was too broad, Justice Kennedy posits 
that: 
 
In all events we must understand Seattle as Seattle understood itself, 
as a case in which neither the State nor the United States “challenge[d] the 
propriety of race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of 
achieving integration, even absent a finding of prior de jure segregation.” 
In other words the legitimacy and constitutionality of the remedy in 
question (busing for desegregation) was assumed, and Seattle must be 
understood on that basis.297  
 
To Justice Kennedy, Seattle is a doctrinal outlier, which must be rejected.298 
That is, because the Court assumed the legitimacy and constitutionality of busing as 
a remedy, there was no reference to the discriminatory intent requirement. This is 
too broad a reading of Seattle. Without a discriminatory intent requirement, Seattle’s 
expansiveness would promote: distribution of benefits based on race;299 standardless 
assessments of what is an “injury” to a racial minority’s political interest in the 
process;300 and balkanization, as racial groups vie for a constitutionally guaranteed 
right to “win” in the process.301 This is the classic racial politics rationale that the 
Court has employed to dismantle race-conscious affirmative action.302 
Seattle, then, guarantees a racialized result premised on a stereotypical 
understanding of the political interests of minorities—this is contrary to neutrality 
                                                   
296 Hunter v. Erickson, 339 U.S. 391 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 
(1967) (stating that courts must assess “the potential impact of official action” in determining 
whether the state is involved in invidious discrimination); Washington v. Seattle Schl. Dist. 
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982) (concluding that when “the State allocates governmental 
power nonneutrally by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the 
decision-making process,” it places a special burden on racial minorities within the process) 
(emphasis added); see supra Part II.A.4 (the same proposition applies to Romer as well). 
297 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633. 
298 Id. at 1634 (noting that the broad reading of Seattle that any state action, with a 
“racial focus,” that makes it more difficult to achieve legislative success is subject to strict 
scrutiny, is contrary to the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence). 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 1634–36. 
302 Betrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the 
Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1565, 1603–24 (2013) 
(discussing racial politics rationale, and concluding that the Court has moved away from a 
race-conscious anti-subordination model that protected racial minorities to a process model 
that views any political gains by racial minorities skeptically).  
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and the post-racial constitutionalism espoused by the Court. Schuette purportedly 
rejects the race-consciousness of Seattle, but this is misleading.303 All the political 
process decisions advance a structural view of polity premised on displacement, not 
a discriminatory intent requirement.304  
Distinguishing Seattle without explicitly overruling it, Justice Kennedy 
emphasizes the fact that there is no injury on the facts in Schuette.305 Since there is 
no clearly identifiable discrimination to remedy, and diversity is not a compelling 
interest in the context of the Michigan voter initiative, the Court characterizes 
judicial review as overly intrusive and a burden on the right of voters to determine 
the state’s course on issues of race.306 Perhaps the most devastating aspect of 
Schuette is its universalist appeal307 to voter empowerment,308 the First Amendment 
and underlying themes of participatory democracy,309 and states as laboratories of 
democracy where contentious “issues” like race can be resolved through public 
debate and experimentation.310 The allure of this democratic myth is belied by its 
embrace of formalistic equality and cynical rejection of the anticaste and 
antisubordination principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court is more concerned with process (and how the status quo can be 
preserved) than with substantive constitutional rights.311 This means that most 
structural inequality is irremediable because the Court’s post-racial 
constitutionalism requires definitive proof of purposeful discrimination by the State. 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality decision is deceptively neutral and moderate; it appeals 
to the higher democratic virtues of debate, participation, and experimentation, but 
                                                   
303 The Schuette plurality rewrites Seattle so that it becomes literally a decision about 
policies which “inure [] primarily to the benefit of the minority,” and this “racial focus,” 
unconstitutionally privileges minorities on the basis of race. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634. 
The Constitution guarantees equal opportunity, not equal results based on race. See supra 
Part I.B. Thus, the Court refashions what “injury” means, so that laws that require racial 
definitions and “the grant of favored status to persons in some racial categories and not 
others,” id. at 1638, can be prohibited by the electorate. Under this conception, all race-
conscious remedies are cast as unconstitutional windfalls to people of color with whites as 
the “victims” of this racially tainted process. This rhetorical inversion has been thoroughly 
critiqued and rejected in the literature. See Girardeau A. Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 
23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 608 (2015) (noting how the Court is deferential to the 
political process when it rejects race-conscious affirmative action, but will intervene and 
invalidate the will of the political community when it embraces race-conscious remedies to 
eradicate subordination and segregation); Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul De Sac of Race 
Preference Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (2006); Stephen A. Plass, Public 
Opinion and the Demise of Affirmative Action, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495, 501 (2002).  
304 See supra notes 144–148, 255–267 and accompanying text. 
305 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636. 
306 Id. at 1636–38. 
307 Barnes, supra note 144, at 2071–72. 
308 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636–37. 
309 Id. at 1637. 
310 Id. at 1630, 1637–38. 
311 Flagg, supra note 46 at 129. 
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there is an underlying tenor of what Professor Darren Lenard Hutchinson terms 
“Racial Exhaustion.”312 The voters of Michigan, after fifteen years of public 
“debate” on the issue of race in which their elected officials were “unresponsive,” 
have chosen the “neutral” policy course of prohibiting consideration of race in all 
state policymaking.313 Justice Kennedy even suggests that affirming the Court of 
Appeals would undermine the legitimacy of the process and the rights of the 
electorate to express their views through duly enacted legislation.314 
While Justice Kennedy’s analysis leaves a very small doctrinal space for 
consideration of race in state decisionmaking—for example, the voters may decide 
that diversity is a compelling interest in Michigan and should be pursued315—there 
is little doubt that Schuette all but completes the Roberts Court’s comprehensive 
assault on race-conscious remedies.316 What is particularly disconcerting is that 
Justices Scalia and Thomas would go even further by overruling Hunter and Seattle. 
 
2.  Justice Scalia’s Concurrence: Formalistic Equality 
 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia opens with a triumphant statement 
that the people have finally embraced the “express encouragement” from the Court 
to dismantle race-conscious affirmative action and prohibit the use of race in state 
policymaking.317 This is a clear indication that the Court intends to codify post-racial 
discourse.318 It has done so. The only question, whether it is under the plurality’s 
approach or Justice Scalia’s concurring view, is: how quickly will this occur? 
Concluding that Hunter and Seattle should be overruled319 because they stand 
for the proposition that “a facially neutral law may deny equal protection solely 
because it has a disparate racial impact,”320 Justice Scalia affirms Washington v. 
Davis as a constitutional absolute, requiring purposeful discrimination; thus, the 
Michigan constitutional amendment is permissible because it is race neutral state 
action. 
  
                                                   
312 Hutchinson, supra note 45, at 922.  
313 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 1638.  
316 See supra notes 62, 144–148 and accompanying text. 
317 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1639–40 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
318 See supra Part I. 
319 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1643 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
320 Id. at 1647. 
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Justice Scalia goes much further than the plurality, advancing a distorted 
federalism argument that the political process theory somehow interferes with state 
sovereignty. Each state has “near-limitless sovereignty”321 to “design its governing 
structure as it sees fit;”322 and, in the absence of any identifiable discrimination, the 
structural displacement of people of color and discrete and insular minorities is 
constitutionally irrelevant.323  
Significantly, all of the Justices in the plurality or concurring opinions presume 
that there was no constitutionally cognizable injury—either because there was no 
identifiable discrimination by the state; or, the electorate was given direct access to 
decisionmaking power, which was removed from unelected university 
policymakers.324 There is no discernible harm under either rationale. This is the most 
troubling aspect of Schuette: there is no acknowledgement of an injury under the 
political process doctrine. This is because the structural analysis underlying the 
political process doctrine has been replaced by the democratic myth. Justice Breyer, 
at least in a narrow sense, embraces the post-racial discourse that advances the 
democratic myth. 
 
3.  Justice Breyer’s Concurrence: Illusory Process 
 
There is a fundamental distinction between Justice Breyer’s interpretation of 
the political process doctrine and Justice Sotomayor’s conception of process and 
representation.325 To Justice Breyer, decisionmaking power is simply moved to a 
level in the process that is closer to the electorate. Emphasizing “access” rather than 
the structural impact of moving decisionmaking authority to a different level of 
government, Justice Breyer concludes that Hunter and Seattle are inapplicable 
because here there was no effort to restructure the political process.326 
It is surprising, given Justice Breyer’s expansively compelling dissent in 
Parents Involved,327 that he would concur in Schuette, an opinion that widens the 
doctrinal chasm between the Court’s public school decisions and its postsecondary 
jurisprudence.328 In Parents Involved, the Court undermined the will of the political 
                                                   
321 Id. at 1646. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. at 1645–48. 
324 Id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The amendment took decisionmaking authority 
away from these unelected actors and placed it in the hands of the voters.”). 
325 Id. at 1652 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This case involves this last chapter of 
discrimination: A majority of the Michigan electorate changed the basic rules of the political 
process in that State in a manner that uniquely disadvantages racial minorities.”). 
326 Id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
327 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803–76 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
328 Id. at 725 (Grutter is inapplicable to elementary and secondary schools). See supra 
note 62 and accompanying text. Contra Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 842 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 83 (2005) (discussing how 
the Court chose an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause which was inclusive and 
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community, and Justice Breyer dissented because the plurality sought to rewrite the 
mandate of Brown.329 But in Schuette, Justice Breyer does not dissent because there 
is no injury, nor a constitutional requirement to pursue diversity through race-
conscious remedies,330 and the viability of such remedies is committed to the 
electorate, not unelected university administrators.331 This is a truly “democratic” 
outcome because equal access and opportunity are sufficient guarantees to a well-
functioning process.332  
Because decisionmaking power was moved from an administrative (unelected) 
process to a political process, there was no diminution of the right to participate 
meaningfully.333 Indeed, minorities had not previously participated in the new 
electoral process, so there was no cognizable injury here.334 Moreover, once the 
process is political, rather than administrative, it is more difficult for courts to 
determine what “structural burden[s]” impact racial minorities.335 But Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence does not acknowledge, as he does in Parents Involved, the real 
outcomes of this “neutral process”—retrogression, resegregation, and exclusion.336 
These outcomes are insignificant in light of the fact that Justice Breyer views the 
process symmetrically: in Parents Involved and Schuette, “decisionmaking through 
the democratic process . . . supports the right of the people . . . to adopt race-
conscious policies for inclusion [as in Parents Involved to preserve the mandate of 
Brown],” and “the right to vote not to do so [as in Schuette].”337  
Because all Michigan voters are given an opportunity to participate in the policy 
debate on diversity, Justice Breyer concludes, “the Constitution foresees the ballot 
box, not the courts, as the normal instrument for resolving differences and debates 
about the merits of these programs.”338 Yet this reasoning supplants the integration 
interest that he identified in Parents Involved. There he endorsed the political 
community’s voluntary decision to embrace integration and prevent resegregation 
in the schools.339 Of course, the decision of the Michigan voters is “voluntary” as 
well, but this symmetry is belied by the burden it places on people of color and 
advocates for race-conscious remedies. Given Michigan’s history of segregated 
schools,340 the integration interest is clearly applicable in Schuette as well. 
                                                   
facilitated the functioning of democracy in Grutter). 
329 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803–04. 
330 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1649 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
331 Id. at 1650–51. 
332 See supra Part I.B. 
333 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 858–72 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
337 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
338 Id. at 1649. 
339 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 819–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
340 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1677–79 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (cataloguing dramatic 
declines in undergraduate, graduate, and professional schools in Michigan); Powell, 
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In Parents Involved, Justice Breyer noted that integration had three essential 
and compelling elements: a historical and remedial element to address the present 
day effects of past discrimination;341 an educational element to overcome the 
“adverse educational effects produced by . . . highly segregated schools”;342 and a 
democratic element which reflects pluralism, diversity, and inclusion.343 By contrast, 
Justice Breyer’s Schuette concurrence discards the remedial and educational 
elements because there is no “intentional discrimination,” and he instead emphasizes 
a formalistic conception of equality, access, and democracy. 
 
4.  Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent: Structural Inequality 
 
By contrast, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent envisions the representation 
reinforcement theory as embracing the anticaste and antisubordination principles 
underlying the Fourteenth Amendment.344 Thus, while it may appear that 
decisionmaking power now resides with the people, the voter initiated constitutional 
amendment restructures the political process.345 This rigging of the process is 
unconstitutional.346 Justice Sotomayor rejects the rhetorical allure of post-racial 
process discourse, and forcefully critiques the democratic myth relied upon by the 
plurality and concurring opinions. 
Rejecting the plurality’s distorted conception of democratic self-governance,347 
Justice Sotomayor concludes that discrimination is not simply evinced by 
particularized intent, it is structural in nature are well.348 Schuette is a new form of 
voter dilution because the only manner in which proponents of race-conscious 
remedies can achieve “success” in Michigan’s political process is to pass a statewide 
constitutional amendment.349 Thus, there is a two-tiered—separate and unequal 
system—for racial minorities and advocates of race-conscious remedies and “a 
separate, less burdensome process for everyone else.”350 This is certainly a 
restructuring of the process that targets and excludes discrete and insular minorities, 
those without power to have meaningful participation in the purportedly neutral 
process. But the process is not neutral, colorblind, or post-racial because it 
                                                   
Milliken, supra note 105; Nancy Kaffer, Racial Divide Sharp in Michigan Schools, DETROIT 
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344 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1654, 1668–70 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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348 Id. at 1663–64 n.8. 
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specifically designates race-conscious remedies for invalidation.351 Under the 
political process doctrine, this type of structural realignment calls for strict 
scrutiny.352 
The plurality’s attempt to neutralize this basic principle is unpersuasive. Since 
there is no compelling interest underlying Section 26,353 the reordering of the 
political system to place burdens on minorities is unconstitutional.354 Indeed, 
Section 26 disrupts the democratic process by essentially “overturning” the central 
holding of Grutter, which permits consideration of race in a holistic admissions 
process. 
The Court has actively constitutionalized reverse discrimination suits355 
through an insurmountable burden of proof of discriminatory intent,356 a rhetorical 
narrative that dismisses race and racism as components of structural inequality,357 
and a formalistic conception of equality that privileges white claims of entitlement 
over the claims of historically oppressed minorities under the myth that most 
discrimination has already been eliminated.358 
Justice Sotomayor critiques Justice Breyer’s narrow conception of Hunter and 
Seattle, which leads him to concur with the plurality. While he would not overrule 
these decisions, as Justice Sotomayor concludes that the plurality did sub silento,359 
he nevertheless concludes that Hunter and Seattle are inapplicable. To Justice 
Sotomayor, Justice Breyer’s central premise is inaccurate—this is not a case about 
simply moving decisionmaking authority from an unelected administrative body 
(faculty members and administrators who receive delegated authority from the 
elected board) to the voters.360 Because Justice Breyer views decisionmaking power 
symmetrically, he fails to acknowledge the asymmetrical impact on discrete and 
insular minorities. The elected Board “retain[ed] complete supervisory authority 
over university officials and over all admissions decisions,”361 but Section 26 
impermissibly reorders the process so that power is “removed . . . from the elected 
boards and placed it . . . at a higher level of the political process in Michigan.”362 
This is precisely what occurred in Hunter and Seattle.363 
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There is a clear distinction between processual access and substantive 
participation in the political process unimpeded by legislative animosity 
camouflaged as neutral decisionmaking.364 Rejecting the plurality’s approach as 
‘“self-government’ without limits,”365 Justice Sotomayor identifies three essential 
features of the right to meaningful participation in the political process: (i) the right 
to vote;366 (ii) the “majority may not make it more difficult for the minority to 
exercise the right to vote”;367 and (iii) “a majority may not reconfigure the existing 
political process in a manner that creates a two-tiered system of political change, 
subjecting laws designed to protect or benefit discrete and insular minorities to a 
more burdensome political process than all other laws.”368  
The plurality adopts a literal process view rooted in formalistic equality. Under 
this view, equal access and opportunity are sufficiently guaranteed once the Court 
removes formal barriers to access. Thus, the Court should not “interfere” in a neutral 
process because this would undermine state sovereignty. This view should be 
rejected because it is the constitutional duty of the Court to keep channels of political 
change open.369 It failed to do so in Schuette, and retrogression and retrenchment are 
almost certainly guaranteed.370 
Leveling a direct rebuke to the Court’s post-racial constitutionalism and its 
contrived conception of participatory democracy, Justice Sotomayor concludes that 
the Court abdicated its role as interpreter of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
antisubordination principle and guardian of the politically powerless, “permitting 
the majority to use its numerical advantage to change the rules midcontest and 
forever stack the deck against racial minorities in Michigan.”371 The Court’s race 
jurisprudence is rigged against racial minorities and the politically displaced. 
 
III.  STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
 
This Article has offered a comprehensive critique of the Roberts Court’s race 
jurisprudence. The Roberts Court’s most recent decision, Schuette, dramatically 
illustrates a new direction for the Court, as it actively encourages political majorities 
to “experiment” with the substantive core of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
invalidating race-conscious remedies. With a substantially weakened body of anti-
discrimination law,372 and the deceptively appealing allure of post-racial democracy, 
the Court has created a new strand of its post-racial constitutionalism. The Court 
now gains “legitimacy” by constitutionalizing the post-racial discourse373 of a 
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citizenry hostile to race-conscious remedies as a means of inclusion and 
transformative social change. 
Doctrinally, the Roberts Court’s race jurisprudence is completely devoid of any 
conceptual recognition of structural inequality.374 Schuette is a paradigmatic 
example of the Court’s adherence to process based values, which exaggerate the 
openness of the polity, and the neutral rhetoric of the democratic myth. This is why 
Justice Sotomayor’s Schuette dissent and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s conception 
of the antisubordination principle375 are essential in interpreting the Equal Protection 
Clause as a constitutional provision for those who are systematically targeted for 
oppression. “Today, however, attempts by government to assist minorities run up 
against the Roberts Court’s perversion of the equal citizenship principle, which 
largely prohibits remedial efforts based on race.”376 
Applying the antisubordination principle to the voter approved Michigan 
constitutional amendment, the Court should have held it unconstitutional because it 
“reenforce[s] systems of subordination that treat some people as second class 
citizens.”377 By restructuring the process so that proponents of race-conscious 
remedies can only succeed in advancing their cause through a statewide referendum 
to amend the Michigan Constitution,378 “[a] majority of the Michigan electorate 
changed the basic rules of the political process in that State in a manner that uniquely 
disadvantaged racial minorities.”379  
This is the essence of second-class citizenship and structural inequality. The 
antisubordination principle rejects the formalistic intent requirement, rigid 
classification categories,380 and neutrality as a rationale for the present day effects 
of past structural inequality. It seeks to eradicate “legally created or legally 
reenforced systems of subordination.”381 
The voter approved constitutional amendment is indicative of a legally 
reinforced system of subordination. African Americans, and other discrete and 
insular minorities, are targeted for displacement.382 Thus, Section 26 of the Michigan 
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Constitution is invalid. All of the Court’s political process decisions fit squarely 
within this canon, and explicitly reject such explicit or implicit exclusion from the 
political process. 
The antisubordination principle emanating in the Equal Protection Clause is 
concerned primarily with the eradication of caste and the advancement of 
substantive equality in the form of equal citizenship. This means that if the state 
targets an historically oppressed or disfavored group for exclusion, explicitly 
through identifiable state action or implicitly through neutral direct democracy 
initiatives, such action is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In either case, 
the process is restructured so that “the state’s allocation of power places unusual 
burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically designed to 
overcome the ‘special condition’ of prejudice,” and the operation of the normal 
political process is “seriously curtailed” so that participation is meaningless.383 
Embracing the antisubordination principle and reaffirming its role as interpreter 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should jettison its illusory equal 
opportunity rhetoric;384 acknowledge that structural inequality exists and that whites 
are not “victims” in the same sense that discrete and insular minorities are;385 
reconceptualize anti-discrimination law so that disparate impact is as significant as 
discriminatory intent in establishing structural inequality and retrenchment;386 and, 
intervene, not to overturn race-conscious remedies adopted by the political 
community, but to provide substantive access, inclusion, and a meaningful 
opportunity to participate and promote transformative social change. Of course, the 
Roberts Court is far from adopting any of these doctrinal propositions, as it is 
enamored with the rhetorical allure of post-racial discourse and the democratic myth. 
The key to dismantling this illusory equality of access is to reject the Court’s 
most recent incarnation of contrived post-racial neutrality. Specifically: 
 
1. The Court should examine the political process itself to determine if it 
undermines the substantive core of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
excluding discrete and insular minorities or erecting insurmountable 
barriers to political success;387 
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2. Political issues involving interpretation of the substantive content of the 
antisubordination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be 
the subject of voter initiatives;388 
 
3. Under its own decisions, impact and political displacement are 
constitutionally relevant;389 so, the Court should reject the doctrinal appeal 
of political process neutrality, and focus instead on structural inequality.390 
 
4. If states do engage in democratic experiments, then voter or other direct 
democracy initiatives should enhance participatory democracy by 
emphasizing inclusion in a manner that reinforces voting as a fundamental 
right;391 and 
 
Finally, the history of the political process itself and how powerless groups 
have been excluded throughout time must be an essential component of any analysis 
of the efficacy of voter initiatives. History played no part in the analysis of Schuette, 
so the value of democratic decision-making was exaggerated, and inequality was 
rationalized as the result of a neutral process, which gave voice to the demands of 
the citizenry.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We are witnessing the power of distorted and neutral rhetoric that rings with 
deceptive clarity. This post-racial process discourse is advanced on many levels: in 
political discourse, by a distrustful citizenry energized by hateful rhetoric that 
appeals to their concerns of being “left behind” on the basis of “preferences” for 
minorities that diminish America’s “greatness,” and a Court that seeks to 
constitutionalize a mythic democracy that promises participation while implicitly 
endorsing structural exclusion. 
Voter initiatives should not determine the substantive core of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. While democratic participation is essential to our Republic, decisions 
like Schuette perpetuate a democratic myth of accessibility while the political 
process has been restructured to ensure that race-conscious remedies are invalid. The 
danger is that we will accept this inequality as a natural product of our democracy. 
The Court once acknowledged this danger in its political process decisions; and, 
while these decisions have not been explicitly overruled, Schuette marks the 
constitutionalization of post-racial process discourse and the democratic myth. Now, 
more than ever, we must reject the rhetorical allure of this contrived neutrality. 
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